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CHINA COLLOQUIUM



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Bylined LYCOMING articles express the opinions
of the authors and are edited only in terms of
space requirements by the editor in consultation
with the individual authors.

Front Cover

Tren-an-men Gate of Heavenly Peace, Peking

Full-Color Covers: When Dr. Mook was assembling the pictures for his article on Severin Roesen-The Williamsport Painter, both he and the editor day-dreamed about reproducing the gorgeous colors on the cover of the LYCOMING. Unwilling to settle for dreams, Dr. Mook found ways to help make it possible. Through the generosity of Samuel J. Dornsife, the color-separation for the *Fruit* picture on the back cover was loaned to the College. A gift by Dr. and Mrs. John J. McDonough paid for the transparency and color-separation for the *Flowers* picture.

The next step was the editor's—find a way to afford the extra press-run to get the full-color pictures instead of our normal two-color cover. Offset Centre Incorporated, in Boalsburg, produced the beautiful work, well within our normal budget for a two-color cover.


The front-page picture is a bonus. When I asked Lois Tretiak if there were any photographs of their trip available she sent six slides with the note, "I hope something from them is usable . . . How nice it would be for me—the rankest of amateur photographers—to have a picture of mine published." Lois, you are now officially a published "pro". We only wish we could also have used your pictures on pages 1, 2, and 3 in their original, equally beautiful, color.

Thank you all for your wonderful cooperation.

Special Thanks: The editor is deeply grateful to Phyllis Holmes, secretary to the president, and Helen Heller, public relations and publications secretary, for their yeoman service in transcribing the China Colloquium from tapes, and again to Helen for all she does to make our publications possible.

LYCOMING COLLEGE

COLLOQUIUM ON CHINA



Ting Ling - Ming - Tombs

CHINESE VIEW OF THE WORLD: OLD AND NEW— HOW DISCONTINUOUS?

By: Dr. Bruce Morgan

As I examined my announced title over the last several weeks, I came to the conclusion that it would be presumptuous and at best highly impressionistic to try to establish, with any degree of precision, how continuous old and new Chinese views of the world are those of you who were here this afternoon heard us talk about the tremendous transformation of China which has been the goal of the present government of China and which has, to a considerable degree—greater in some areas than in others—already been achieved. So we are aware of the fact that there are tremendous discontinuities between the old China and the new, and surely also in the views of the world which the old China and the new have held. What I would like to do then is to talk about some subtle, symbolic continuities which I think do exist between the way Chinese viewed the world before 1949 and the way they view the world today—between traditional China and modernizing China of today with its capital in Peking.

It certainly is, from the standpoint of people's social psychology, very important that in a period of tremendous change and transformation they have some relatively unchanging cultural symbols to which they can continue to attach themselves. The function of such continuities has been observed by students of different revolutions, and I think that these subtle symbolic continuities are important as we examine China. I am a student of religion; I have taught, through the years, in the area of Chinese religious and philosophic history, and I will be drawing on some of that inheritance as we go along.

The first continuity which I want to point to, the first of these symbolic continuities, is the continuing existence in China today of the notion

of an orthodox ideology or philosophy handed down authoritatively from above. Since at least the Chou dynasty, which ended in the third century B.C., there has been in China the notion of the proper existence of an orthodox ideology or philosophy. It is not new to the Chinese to be indoctrinated into an orthodox ideology or philosophy.

Now, this does not mean that there have not been, through the centuries or now, competitors for that role. If one goes back to the classic period of Chinese history in the few centuries before the Christian era, one discovers Confucians struggling with Taoists and both with the followers of Mo Tzuists and all of them with the followers of the Lord Shang, the Legalists or the Realists, each of these ideological schools striving to be and to provide an orthodox political philosophy, an orthodox ideology for China. Sooner or later one or another won out in the struggle, but they were usually modified by each other in the struggle.

We see this happening many other times. An example is the 13th and 14th century with different kinds of Neo-Confucianisms struggling to be the orthodox ideology of philosophy of China. We see, in the late 19th century after the beginnings of the invasions by the west, attempts made by different schools of Confucianists in China to update and modernize Confucianism. They struggled with each other and did not all agree how this was to be accomplished.

In the 20th century we find Sun Yat-sen writing a great work called "The Three Peoples Principles", the San Min Chi I. This became a bible; it became a



classic of the Chinese revolution and the Kuomintang regime right down to 1949. It was a strange blend of western motifs and western materials with Sun Yat-sen's particular form of Confucianism. We find Chiang Kai-shek attempting the same thing at a later time. And we find the same struggle going on in China today. I think one of the things that is going on in Peking now, under a kind of facade which purports to be a resolution of difficulties, is a continuing ideological struggle as to just what form the orthodox ideology or philosophy is to take.

A second continuity is that this orthodox ideology or philosophy is essentially, in Chinese history and today, a philosophy of society and social relationships. Just why this is the case is not altogether clear, but it already was the case before the Christian era. It may be the ancient Chinese crowdedness on the land, the pressure of population on resources which is very, very old in China. It may be the uncertain climate with a tremendous unevenness in moisture and rainfall and the monsoonal climatic situation with the continual occurrence of drought and flood which created a need, at a very early point, for tremendous public works. In any case, we find that there is in Chinese orthodox ideology very little concern for what westerners have called metaphysics. Instead, the ideology has been earthy and pragmatic. Even Taoism, which seemed not to be in its original proposal a public philosophy, was itself earthy and pragmatic.

Now within that philosophy another continuity is this, that within that philosophy leadership has been and is today accredited on the fundamental basis of moral virtue and not of narrow technical competence. There is a wonderful little fragment which I brought along from the *Classic of History* which is the *Shu-Ching*, the second of the five Confucian canonical books, from that period roughly around the beginning of the Christian era. We can not date each particular fragment. But it is an account of the attempt to establish the succession after the first great mythical emperor who mythically ruled in the 22nd or 23rd Century B.C. This is not, strictly speaking, an historical period in Chinese history. "And

the emperor said, 'Find me a man old Sze-you (Sze-you was one of his counselors). We have reigned for seventy years.' " The emperor suggests that Sze-you might be his successor, and Sze-you says that he would like to decline. He does not want to be the successor to the emperor, "I am unworthy of the throne," he says. And then the emperor says, "Show me one of great or of no repute." And the answer was by acclamation—it is very important that it was by acclamation—everybody perceived this. This is somewhat mythical, but this is the way it is told. "There is a man, unmarried, of the common people, his name is Sun of Yu." The emperor said, "Yes, I have heard of him. What of him?" And the advisor replied, "He is the son of a blind man; his father is an utter churl; his mother is a scold, his older brother is arrogant. By filial duty he has been able to live in harmony with them and, by slow degrees, bring them to order. They have now lost the capacity for wickedness." The emperor said, "I will test him." He did, and Sun of Yu became the very successful second mythical emperor.

I spent the time to record this simply because this tradition of the recognition of the accreditation of political leadership in this philosophy, on the basis of moral virtue, is very, very old and it still continues. Knowledge of the moral classics and civil service examinations taken on those moral classics, all through the centuries, accredited bureaucrats who then proceeded to rule China. They might be in charge of irrigation canals, locks, dams, or county government, but their preparation for that was to learn the Confucian classics of moral philosophy. Their knowledge of the moral classics and the quality of their theory in practice in social relationships—this is what accredited them for leadership. And I think this is not very different from the mastery of the teachings of Chairman Mao which is the accreditation for leadership in China today.

A part of the struggle in the great cultural revolution, which has been going on in China, is the struggle over defining the right kind of moral leadership in China. I brought along a book written not long ago but based on notes taken in China by William Hinton back in the 40's when he was living in a Chinese village, the village of Long-Bow, in south Shansi province in the early stages of the Peoples Revolution after the liberation. This was in an area which was actually liberated at the end of the Second World War in 1945. The book is a beautiful, lengthy, detailed, and very careful description of the early stages of Fan-Shen, which is the turn over, or the turning of the body, the upturning of society in south Shansi province in the early days of the revolution. Near the end of the book, he asks why have they been as successful as they have been? And he says that part of it is that they really were careful; they planned; they paid attention to small details and to the actual relation-

ships between people and production in the society. Part of it was their admirable patience, but then he says, "The example which the communist set in their everyday lives was as decisive as the words they spoke or the plans they suggested. In the last analysis, it was the superior moral character exhibited by the revolutionaries, their integrity, their dedication, their willingness to suffer, their honesty in facing mistakes, their acceptance of criticism, and their capacity for self-criticism, that moved the peasant. It was because the communist set public interest ahead of private interests, long-range interests ahead of short-range interests, and the general good ahead of any partial good, and did so in their personal lives, that the peasants were willing to follow them." So I am arguing that there is this continuity which is very, very old in China, that leadership, within this public philosophy—this orthodox political philosophy, is legitimized by moral excellence, by the quality of moral virtue.

Now another continuity, and this is one which I think hard to establish and I may be inferring too much here, is that, throughout the history of China since the time of Confucius, leadership has been legitimized not only by moral virtue, but by signs of its possession of the Mandate of Heaven—the *Tien Ming*, The Command of Heaven. This is, of course, connected with moral virtue, since the mandate of heaven is rendered on the basis of moral virtue.

Traditionally through the centuries, the signs of the possession of the *Ting Ming* have been that certain phenomena were not occurring. There were no droughts, starvation, and famine; there were no pestilences and floods; there were no civil wars or insurrections; there was no disharmony among the people or corruption in high places. In other words, if all these things were lacking, there was a harmony among heaven, earth, and man which was perceived as good and validated the possession of the mandate of heaven for those in power.

I was in China in the late 1940's, in those years of the downfall of the Kuomintang, and again and again I heard what was really my first existential acquaintance with

the notion of a mandate of heaven. I had read about it before, but again and again I heard from people—both very, very lowly peasants and people in very, very high places who were permitted or permitted themselves to talk so freely with me—that the Kuomintang had obviously lost the mandate of heaven. There were just so many signs that this was the case, aside from examining the moral character of the leadership of the Kuomintang. There were so many objective signs—this was perceived of as an objective affair—that the leadership of the Kumintang had lost the *Ting Ming*. And once lost, it is really conceived of as impossible to regain, or once lost beyond a certain point.

It also was interesting, since this is a somewhat religious idea, to hear communist cadres claiming that the mandate of heaven had indeed been transferred to them. I have not talked to communists recently about this in China. I do not know if it is still claimed, but it certainly was claimed then by many communist leaders at the local, county, and provincial levels in the liberated zones. And I think that the signs are right and have been increasingly so in spite of great difficulties in China. The signs continue to be favorable, to indicate that this regime has the mandate of heaven, and it is still possible for Chinese people to interpret their history this way.

Another continuity seems to be the persisting, the subtly transmuted sense, on the part of the Chinese people, that they are living in a sacred society on a sacred soil. One could say everything is secularized, but that is only an easy way out of answering the question, "What is the religious commitment of people in a society such as that in China today?" Land has always been absolutely fundamental to Chinese livelihood—the distribution of land, the possession of land, the retention of land for family; these concerns were always immensely important. The features of the land were important as to where one buried one's ancestors. One interpreted one's origins as being on a particular piece of land, even if by accident or circumstance one was not born there one said that one came from that place it that was the clan land—one's "Pen-Ti", one's native spot. Land is still important in China and the use of land has been immensely reorganized and refashioned for the people since 1949. But I suspect that there is, in a transformed way, a profound religious character to the sense that they are still living in a sacred society on sacred soil.

One final continuity that I would like to point to is the persisting and less frustrated sense of Chinese cultural and moral superiority. This is an old, old Chinese belief. When I listened to the conversations between Chou En-lai and Richard Nixon, and when I watched their faces and the faces of Chinese greeting Americans in Peking, I may have been reading something in here, but I think I



Stone Sculpture - Ming Tombs Area

perceived that there was a very confident sense of the continued cultural and moral superiority. It was in new terms of a communist culture, a new man, a new Maoist human being—but still a confident sense of a cultural and moral superiority of China. That is very important, because from about the 1840's to 1940's, a little over a hundred years, that sense was under tremendous attack in Chinese history. John King Fairbank wrote many years ago that the Chinese had suffered from and exhibited, all through the latter part of the 19th century and up to the middle of the 20th century, "a defensive ethnocentricity". In other words, they clung desperately to the notion that they were superior, while being confronted with all kinds of objective signs, historically, that somehow or other

they were not superior or at least were not thought to be superior by many, many others. I think now they have shifted from defensive ethnocentricity, in a way, back to a confident ethnocentricity, with considerable reason.

So, to go back to the original question, "How continuous?" I will not attempt to say. Who can say? But, I think that these subtle, symbolic continuities, inasmuch as I have properly identified them, may have much to do with the considerable success which the communist leadership has already had in the great push toward transformation and change in China, the great push toward what are indeed very significant discontinuities.

URBAN PROBLEMS IN MODERN CHINA

By: B. Michael Frolic

Foreigners usually go to the cities when they visit China and consequently see mainly urban things. However, eighty percent of the Chinese live in the countryside. In my talk I hope to describe some of the features of urban life and also point out differences in city life and country life.

Compared to American and Soviet standards, China is a poor country. It has a low standard of living and a low gross national product. Estimated annual per capita income is only \$100. Per capita income in the cities is higher than in the countryside. Income in the countryside is supplemented by income from private crops. People grow vegetables and fruit and raise a pig or two, if they can. No one starves in China, despite the fact that it is a poor country. No one looks sick. People are well dressed by Asian standards, and their standard of living is rising. I say this after having visited China, twice, in 1965 and in 1971.

I have no hard statistics; the Chinese do not publish these kinds of statistics. You have to have an instinct for these things and try to gauge the extent to which things have changed. I visited the same cities in 1965 and 1971 and noticed big differences. Despite the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese have better clothing and more of it. The basic blues and white are now supplemented by colored prints. People have more bicycles, wrist watches, and sewing machines. The shops have more goods in them, and people are buying. If you would press me to compare China to the Soviet Union, I would say that the standard of living is lower in China. But, paradoxically, the Chinese eat better,

have more variety in their diet, and have better quality goods in their stores.

Most cities have an excellent system of cheap transportation. You can get around on their buses. There are no traffic jams, and people get to and from work easily with no rush hour problems. There is even a twenty-three kilometers (fifteen miles) long subway in Peking. It is not in actual operation yet. A bicycle, which is what most of the people try to buy, cost three months wages. There are no cars to speak of; most vehicular traffic consists of trucks, some buses, and many carts pulled by animals or humans. So that is the other side.

Let's take pollution. There is no real pollution. Though you do see factories occasionally producing smoke. There is a certain amount of smog hanging over Shanghai at times. On the other hand there is no pollution from cars—there are no cars. Furthermore, you do not find waste and litter lying around, because there is no litter. They do not have paper in abundance to wrap up their goods, so they do not have huge garbage collection problems.

There is no crime in Chinese cities. The Chinese leave produce in the streets overnight unattended, and it is still there in the morning. It is not stolen. You leave your hotel room open; nobody takes anything from you if you are a foreigner. Now it may not be the same if you are Chinese. One hears stories of some crime. People do have bicycle locks on their bicycles. You are sometimes cautioned to keep an eye on your belongings, but basically there does not seem to be a significant amount of crime. On the other hand, maybe there is no crime because the system is highly controlled. Everyone knows what everyone else is doing. Maybe there is no crime because it is very difficult to have a weapon. Maybe there is no crime because there is not much to be stolen. One has to evaluate it in those terms, too. Maybe there is no crime

because there is no drug problem. There are no drugs; so there is no theft to get money to buy drugs. I did see one crime. Somebody had stolen a purse from a woman and began to run down the street with the booty. He was instantly swallowed-up about fifty yards later by about 150 Chinese; they just surrounded him, and that was that. It started me thinking how in New York City those 150 people would have disappeared—run the other way. The New York thief would have had a gun or a knife; the Chinese thief did not.

Municipal services are cheap in cities—\$1.00 a month for water or electricity. On the other hand, not every apartment has running water or a separate bathroom. So again, you have to look at both sides. Housing is cheap. Rent plus all utilities would cost you less than ten percent of your total income. It would be good if we could do that here. On the other hand, people who have been studying Chinese housing claim that the average space per capita is 4' x 3'; twelve square feet is all the space you have. Now if that is true, then you are not getting very much for your ten percent. On the other hand, that may be more than you were getting a generation ago, or it may be cleaner and better. Its yours to live in, and that is important too.

Public facilities are cheap in the cities. It does not cost \$10 to go to the theatre. It doesn't cost \$12 to go to the Stanley Cup Playoffs. It does not cost a phenomenal amount to buy a book. On the other hand, a Western critic may say, "Yes, but what are you getting for this? You are getting a limited bill of fare—the same eight plays over and over again since the Cultural Revolution, a very particular kind of art, a very particular kind of entertainment which is rigidly controlled." Taken from the western capitalist point of view one may conclude that this is unsatisfactory. However, for the masses of China, it may be very satisfactory having just come up from illiteracy to the point where, when they have their day off a week in a forty-eight hour work week, they can go to a public park for nothing and read a newspaper or book which costs almost nothing. They can go to a play or opera for almost nothing. That is a reasonable achievement in the context of a society that twenty-five years ago was eighty percent illiterate. We have to take these things into consideration.

You can say that one virtue of Chinese cities is the great amount of community organization. Everybody in the community is part of an organization. Everybody knows where everyone is all of the time. This is to some extent a legacy from Kuomintang days. It is good to feel that you are part of a community, particularly in a large sprawling city where there are a lot of things going on. But, it is not always

good to feel so much a part of an organization that you can not really get away by yourself.

We can look at food. Plenty of food is available in Chinese cities; much more than what we think and at a good price. A few pennies will buy you a meal—a bowl of rice and some vegetable. You may not get meat everyday, but then before the Revolution Chinese peasants might have eaten meat only five or six times a year, so it is good if you now get it two or three times a week, even once a day if you are lucky. However, some items still are rationed. Rice in the south and wheat in the north (along with their protein equivalent in cereals) are rationed, although it seems to be a generous ration. Nevertheless you have to pay for them by coupon. You also have to pay for edible vegetable oils and cotton clothing by coupon. Only cotton is rationed; synthetic cotton is not rationed, nor are silk or synthetic silks, but silk is more expensive.

Let us consider the average budget of a couple in the city. Husband and wife both work. They have two children. That may be assuming a little too much—maybe one-half of a child too much. They make about eighty-five yuan a month. The husband makes forty-five and the wife forty, or it could be the other way around. Food is fairly inexpensive, but still, of that eighty-five yuan, they will probably spend about fifty percent for food, twelve percent for clothing, and about nine percent for rent and utilities for a large room. They share cooking facilities and a bathroom down the hall. They send one child to a school of some kind and have to pay a fee for books, which comes to two percent of their income. They might have to pay two percent for medical services, a small fee.

There are other expenses too, but there is no income tax. Transportation costs about nine percent, although one or both may be working for a factory that has a truck that comes by and picks them up. They may get additional services from the factory where they work. If the children are young enough, the mother may take the children to the factory's day-care center. There may be medical services there, too. This adds up to seventy-one yuan, so they have fourteen yuan left over for savings. After a while, say in a year they could almost buy a wrist watch or a bicycle. In other words, a bit is left over. And that is important.

Now let us look at urban policies in China. The Chinese are trying to limit urban development and to structure their urban growth in a particular way.

Since the revolution, the Chinese have tried to limit the size of large cities, such as Shanghai, Peking, and Canton and have sought to distribute the population more equally throughout the country.

They have tried to lessen dependence on coastal cities by moving people inland to unsettled areas—building new towns if necessary. They have tried to keep people out of big cities by keeping new industries out of big cities. The Soviet Union did exactly the same thing, or tried to do the same thing, in the 1930's, 1940's, and 1950's, and I might add, in so doing failed to limit the growth of the big cities. I am not saying that the Chinese are going to fail. They are going about it in a more systematic way than the Russians.

Russia was eighteen percent urban at the time of her revolution, just as China is eighteen to twenty percent urban now. In 1971 Russia was sixty percent urban. Russia urbanized, and, in so doing, they made a decision to collectivize the peasantry, by force if necessary, and to sacrifice the surrounding countryside in order to industrialize rapidly. But, where do you locate the factories? If you locate them in the cities, you must build up the cities. So Moscow's population jumped from one million in 1920, to seven or eight million today. It's maximum size, according to the 1935 plan, was to be five million. It keeps getting bigger, and they keep changing the plan.

The Russians have not solved the problem of ever-growing cities. Why will the Chinese be able to solve it? I am not saying they will, but they have developed policies which they are trying out. One is simply to take people out of the city, not just to prevent or to make it difficult for peasants to come to the cities. They have to have passes, a job, housing. Housing is limited, and jobs are not that easy to find. They have to get permission. The Soviet Union had the same kind of a structure. But, in China, they also are sending people out of the cities. They are taking young people and sending them out to the countryside, sometimes forever. They are sending leaders, cadres, to the country to find out what it is like to be a peasant, to work among peasants, and hopefully to stay in the countryside.

At the same time they are trying to de-centralize industry, take industries out of the big cities, put industries in the countryside. It is not easy; factories tend to locate in big cities for obvious reasons: concentration of population, transportation and communication advantages, markets. It is not that easy to take a chemical factory and plunk it in the middle of a field. They have to build up an infrastructure: roads, utilities, housing, etc.

US - CHINA FOREIGN RELATIONS

When the history of the international system of the last few years is written, with more hindsight than we may now have, I suspect that history will show that several important developments occurred which influenced the dramatic changes in Chinese foreign policy of the last three years, that these changes were in part derived from changes within the Chinese political system, but that the bulk of them derived from events within other countries, which in turn affected the entire international political system, which in turn affected how China and that system interacted. In sum, there have been a lot of diplomatic fuses being laid in the past few years, and they have been lit with startling rapidity—particularly during the past year.

This should not be taken to mean that Chinese decision-makers have essentially been manipulated by the international environment. Clearly they have not been. But they have been, if you will, passive actors. Had the rest of the international system not been in a state of increasingly great flux as well, then it is unlikely that the Chinese leadership would have been so successful in changing China's relationship with the system.

I think it is well for me to sketch out, rather extensively, what some of these realignments among

By Daniel Trethak

nation-states have been within the international system, in order to set the scene for reflecting on developments in current Chinese foreign policy.

It seems to me that it is most crucial to examine first, the changes in the international position of the United States during the past decade, but particularly during the past five years. In sharply simplistic terms, the United States is no longer the preeminent actor in the international system that it was ten years ago. The state of affairs is readily perceived by the rest of the system and is generally accepted by most, if not all, U.S. decision-makers. Without going into the disgusting mess that is the Vietnam now Indo-China War, the U.S. involvement in Indo-China has drained U.S. political-military capabilities in more ways than can be accounted for in merely dollars and cents. America's main enemy in Indo-China has not been the Democratic Republic of Vietnam nor the National Liberation Front. It has been the stubborn "commitment" of U.S. decision-makers who refuse to cut their losses and abandon a hopeless cause which has primarily caused the weakening of the U.S. position throughout the world.

Nevertheless, it can be done. It will de-centralize a city, and it also will have a strategic value in case of attack.

The Chinese not only try to de-emphasize urban growth, they also seek to make rural life more attractive. How is rural life made more attractive, aside from propaganda and novels and plays about the idealized peasants? Much of the Cultural Revolution had to do with de-emphasizing the advantages of the city and the building-up of the countryside by improving the schools and making more jobs available in the countryside. They are trying to invest in the countryside, i.e., in small implement factories making machinery for the countryside. This does not mean a big plant in Pittsburgh, but rather, between Pittsburgh and Williamsport. They are trying to de-centralize, to build-up small industry and commerce in the countryside, to modify trade patterns.

If they can put this all together, how long-lasting will the policy be? Will it continue as a viable policy in China over the next decade or longer? Is it the solution? Can they industrialize, develop, raise the standard of living, and at the same time keep people out of cities? If they can, then this is

a new and unusual policy. It is not the kind of strategy that has been adopted in any other developing country, whether it was Britain during the Industrial Revolution, the United States, or the Soviet Union—which finally gave up and said we can not prevent you from moving into the cities. Now Soviet social scientists are saying that big cities are better than small cities because they are more productive in terms of economics.

The point is maybe the Chinese do have something here, for China at least, in terms of balanced economic growth. Whether they can resist the pressures of urbanization and get people in the cities to develop a more de-centralized society is difficult to say, because it still seems that everything “modern” happens in the city. So if you stop urbanization can you still modernize?

Historically, the Chinese have not extolled cities that much. Cities have tended to perform administrative functions, where identified with foreigners, and, during the Cultural Revolution, were identified with bad values—bad, bureaucratic values. The Chinese, at this point, seem to view cities somewhat differently than we do. They do not see them as citadels of knowledge, wisdom, greatness, progress.

But other significant factors have also been at work which probably would have led to a more gradual corroding of America’s influence during the past decade. Regardless of the Vietnam war, Japanese-American relations would have begun to enter into a new form, and Soviet-American tensions, in areas such as Middle Eastern Europe, would have continued even as the U.S. and the USSR had cooperated on certain international activities. But, when all is said and done, it is the Vietnam War which, more than any single problem, has weakened the United States’ international position. And it may very well be that the war has ironically contributed, in two ways, to the improvement in Sino-American relations.

First, the U.S. entered the Vietnam War because it erroneously perceived that China was in back of the DRV-NLF effort to unseat the Diem government and its successors. While it was Vietnamese, not Chinese, nationalism which inspired the enemies of the Republic of Vietnam, that is South Vietnam, United States decision-makers did not see things that way in the early 1960’s, for example. Hence, when the people’s war in Vietnam stopped—cold—the huge American military involvement in Indo-China, U.S. decision-makers may have consciously or unconsciously begun to realize that they would have to come to terms with their perceived enemy in Asia—China—like it or not. To paraphrase the late Che Guevarra, the United States did not want to fight “two, three or more Vietnams” in Asia or anywhere else, not only

because the American people are unwilling to tolerate such actions, but because they would have excessively weakened an already corroding U.S. global position. Hence, the U.S. had to do what it was unwilling to do for twenty-two years, deal directly, equally, and without hostility with the leading power in Asia—China—and accept the reality of the Chinese revolution, whether it liked it or not. Since 1969, the Nixon administration, much to too many people’s surprise, has carefully, skillfully, and sensitively moved to improve Sino-American bilateral relations concurrent with withdrawing U.S. troops from Vietnam.

The Indo-China war may also have ironically helped to improve Sino-American relations in another way. Both China and the U.S., tacitly, or perhaps in secret not too tacitly, agreed to limit the conflict in Indo-China to the client states and that no direct Chinese-American conflict would emanate from the Indo-China war. From late 1964 until mid 1966, we know that some Chinese officials almost certainly advocated that China play a more active role in the Vietnam war. And it is likely, although I do not believe the Pentagon papers have really touched on this subject, that some U.S. officials would not have minded trying to bomb China “back into the stone age” along with the DRV. But both countries’ hawks were overruled, and from time to time when, for example, American planes came close to or actually strayed into Chinese territory, even during

the hectic days of the cultural revolution, China did not overreact but simply protested these undeniable and undeniable incursions. By the same token, the U.S. did not make any case out of the fact that at one time 50,000 Chinese troops were doing road work and probably manning anti-aircraft guns in the DRV. In sum, both sides very rigorously laid down limits as to how far the conflict would expand in Indo-China. It would not, as in Korea, result in an essentially direct Sino-American conflict, but would be limited to war only by proxy, even though there would be rather high hostility, particularly on the Chinese side vis-a-vis the United States.

When we rigorously examine, in retrospect, the development of the Sino-American detente, we may thus conclude, with tremendous irony, that the Vietnam war, because it determined the boundaries of Sino-American conflict and hostility, forced each power to recognize that the other was not the threat which it was supposed to be and that, ultimately, each could find ways to live together, particularly in Asia.

Let us now shift from the importance of Vietnam for U.S. foreign policy and its relationship to Sino-American relations, to the problem of Japan. Rather briefly put, well before the Nixon administration took office, the apparent smoothness which characterized post World War II U.S.-Japanese relations was wearing thin. Economic relations were at the heart of the problem, but I suspect that, just as within the memory of Chinese leaders, there is a very real fear of a remilitarized Japan, at least some American officials, correctly or not, are perceiving that Japan could pose more than an international and an international economic problem for the U.S. and therefore should be checked not only by the Nixonomics of last summer but by Sino-American rapprochement which would place certain political-psychological and political-military limitations on Japanese actions in East Asia, even as the U.S. would by no means cut its ties with Japan.

Instead, what the U.S. government has clearly done, despite Japan's generally justifiable and understandable chagrin, is simply to make it clear, to both Japan and China, that the U.S. wants to have an even-handed policy in East Asia and play no favorites between Japan and China. The policy will even allow the U.S. to possibly play a mediative role in Sino-Japanese relations in the coming years, because, those relations are bound to become normalized, although they will not be without their political, military, and economic tensions.

Another irony may affect Sino-American relations, this time with regard to Japan. The strikingly blunt Nixon-Chou En-lai joint communique of February 27, 1972 omitted any specific Chinese demand for withdrawal

of U.S. military forces from Japan. That omission may very well be a subtle hint that China is not unwilling to see an American military presence continue in Japan to act as a brake on Japanese ambitions to increase further development of their military establishment or ultimately go nuclear. The Chinese, as in the Vietnam situation, may have learned and/or realized that it is easier to live even in an uneasy peace with a U.S. military presence to which they have become accustomed than it would be to cope with a new enemy of whom they have, justifiably, very bitter memories.

If U.S.-Japanese problems are primarily economic in nature, albeit with possible political military overtones, U.S.-Soviet problems are just the opposite. Despite the overall Soviet-American detente formulated in the mid-1950's, tensions and relations between the two super powers have continued to exist, especially in the Middle East and Europe, but also in Asia, Africa, and Latin America to a certain extent. Throughout the past fifteen plus years, the U.S. permitted the USSR to preserve the luxury of having either harmonious or hostile relations with China as the USSR chose, but the U.S. foolishly acted for hostile relations with China. Such an inept policy gave the USSR subtle leverage in its dealings with the U.S. in both the Middle East and Europe because it had relatively little reason to worry about problems emanating from its eastern flank.

Just as ironies exist in U.S.-Vietnam and U.S.-Japanese relations which favorably affect Sino-American relations, one exists in Soviet-Chinese relations which has also favorably affected those relations. Soviet policy toward China in the 1968 to 1972 period has been perceived by the Chinese as so hostile that China had no choice but to improve relations with the U.S. Fortunately for China, the U.S., for reasons we have stated, has cause to initiate a new china policy concurrent with Chinese desires to initiate a new U.S. policy. During the past five years, had the Soviet decision-makers involved with making policy toward China not shown the kind of rigidity exemplified by John Foster Dulles, even going so far as to imitate their Pentagon counterparts by threatening China with nuclear attack, the dramatic improvement in Sino-American relations may well not have occurred. That is why I often remark that those Soviet decision-makers in charge of making China policy ought to all be sacked and exiled to Siberia and replaced by Soviet-China specialists who, you will pardon the expression, I have found to be relatively "soft on Chinese communism."

But as Harrison Salisbury brilliantly noted in a *New York Times* book review late last year, the Soviets have had their functional equivalent of a

McCarthy era on China. Hence, it is unlikely, but not impossible, that we will quickly see a Sino-Soviet rapprochement developing along the lines of improved Sino-American or even Sino-Japanese relations—if for no other reason but that China has enough to concern itself with in continuing to keep improving relations with the U.S. and Japan and can now afford to force the Soviets to settle outstanding issues on China's terms, which I think the USSR could and should have done, from the point of Soviet national interests, quite some time ago.

If the Americans have been forced by the realities of the international system to readjust their policies toward China, as I have suggested all along, those realities also show China that it might be in China's interest to improve relations with the U.S. in Vietnam, the U.S. did fight a limited war—however brutal, immoral, and senseless the conflict. China did not have to fight the U.S. directly in southeast Asia, was rarely subject even to U.S. military accidents emanating from the air war in Vietnam, and was allowed the luxury of carrying out the cultural revolution at home precisely at the height of the Vietnam war.

Sino-Japanese relations, made tense by charges of increased Japanese predilections toward the revival of militarism, were counter-balanced by Chinese realizations that the Japanese-American alliance was weakening and that there were and are extremely powerful forces in Japan which wanted and still want to normalize Sino-Japanese relations. I do not believe that it was accidental that, in our interview with Chou En-lai on the morning of the 31st of January of this year, Japanese militarism was not referred to by the Premier although it was briefly referred to by the Premier, although it was briefly

As I have already suggested, Soviet policy toward China could not have hardened at a worse time. The U.S. was moving toward a reconciliation with China, not simply because it suspected that China might be responsive to the Soviet threat, but because it was good and realistic U.S. policy to deal directly with the real China—that is the People's Republic of China and not the government in exile on Taiwan which calls itself the Republic of China but which is neither a republic nor is it of China.

Let me now make some quick comments on main trends in Chinese foreign policy as I see them developing in the next several years. First, China will be an increasingly important actor on the international scene. It does not like to be called a super power but, as one official we talked with in Peking allowed, China prefers to be viewed as “a major factor” in international politics. This will particularly be the case in Asia where it will confront and be confronted by complex relationships

with the U.S., USSR, and Japan. China may not play super-power politics there, but it will be playing great power politics in that area. This means, as far as I am concerned, that it will attempt to continue its *modus vivendi* with the U.S., attempt to manipulate Japan into following the U.S. into enacting a new China policy, and particularly keep up its military guard against the Soviet attack. It was not accidental that we saw more troops in Peking than anywhere else in China. Air raid shelters first began to be built in Chinese cities in 1969 after the Sino-Soviet border clashes of that spring.

Second, as part and parcel of China playing the role of a great power in Asia, I expect that the People's Republic will continue to attempt to develop trade and diplomatic relations with any country willing to establish them on basic Chinese terms. Such a trend in Chinese foreign policy is not new, although some people on both the right and the left in the U.S., Canada, and Taiwan did not believe it. They erroneously feel that China will continue to support floundering people's war movements in southeast Asia when the opportunity exists for China to improve its position in Asia by establishing relations with extant governments.

Third, China will not, nor can not, sell out the cause of the Indo-China peoples because it has no need to do so. That cause is proving successful; therefore, China will continue to support it. Even if China wished to reduce its support, thereby hoping to force the DRV and the NLF to settle on terms not to their liking, China lacks the capability to force the DRV and the NLF to enact such a policy. There is no reason for China to pull the Americans' chestnuts out of the Vietnam fire. It is sufficient that both the U.S. and China have agreed to attempt to normalize their relations, even as the Indo-China war continues, and it is foolhardy to expect that China should or wants to help the U.S. solve its main cold war hangover.

Fourth, outside of Asia I expect that China will play an important but secondary role, closely identifying with Third World causes but not at the cost of seriously jeopardizing a Sino-American rapprochement. China can have improved relations with the U.S. and still support guerrillas in Angola, Mozambique, and South Africa if it so chooses, and it can also give aid to Pakistan, Tanzania, and Cuba without making the Americans very up-tight.

Fifth, probably the major problem confronting China now and in the next several years, indeed perhaps for the rest of the century, will be how to order its relations with the USSR. Once Sino-American and Sino-Japanese relations are normalized, and this could happen before the end of the year, China will

performance, have to focus in on how to deal with the Russians. Given the long and tenuous history of Sino-Russian (not simply Sino-Soviet relations) plus the huge border between the two countries, this will be an immensely absorbing, crucial, and even hazardous problem for China. China desperately wants to modernize itself agriculturally and industrially. But as long as the Soviet threat is as real as I think the Chinese perceive that it is, then this process will be slower than the Chinese leaders would prefer.

My sixth and final comment is both a reflection and a prediction. The international system is in great flux and the changing Sino-American relationship has been caused by that flux and in turn has produced new flux. The new Chinese-American relationship furthermore, is essentially a capstone to a major goal of the Chinese revolution. It, combined with the vote at the United Nations last October, legitimized for better or worse, the place of a revolutionary China in the international system.

COMMENTS By: Lois D. Tretiak

It is a delightful thing for me to comment, because in essence what I am going to do is not criticize that which has gone before me, rather, supplement it primarily on the basis of my recent experience in China and on some study of China as well.

In talking about life in China today, one of the things which Bernie Frolic mentioned was the whole business of mobility. I am fascinated by this. What I want to talk about is not social mobility, not one climbing and trying to outdo the one next door and this kind of thing, but rather the actual movement of people from one area to another. Around China I asked, on numerous occasions, where a person came from, how long he had been in a particular area. In the Anyuan mines, for example, I asked a miner if he encountered people from other parts of the country. He said, "Oh, yea, from all over the place." I asked him to be a bit more specific, but he just said he had seen young people working around the mines from all over the country. In Canton, I noticed a lady at the Cadre school that we visited who was quite tall (5'-10" or 11', quite a robust lady) who later said that she was from Heilungkiang in the northeast. Many, many senior Cadres in various parts of the country had come into those positions in the 40's, 1949, 50, 51, from other parts of the country. Some had been in the area where they had been assigned for twenty-some years; others had come in more recent times. There is great mobility of this sort, leaders and cadres appointed by the center to various parts of the country quite removed from their *Pen-ti*—the place where they were born.

which result may ironically show that China will not be as revolutionary in the future as it has been perceived by many of its enemies and "friends" in the past. As a concomitant of the new state of affairs in this international system, I expect to see a fluid state of relations developing among the great powers, particularly in Asia but generally globally. In the next few years there will be contention and cooperation among the great powers, but the new Sino-American relationship, symbolized by President Nixon's visit to China, I feel essentially marks the end of the Cold War.

A multi-polar world may not be an easy one to live with, but that is what we are going to have. Indeed, some of us may look back at the Cold War fondly as the good old days when it was rather easy to identify the good guys and the bad guys. But that era is over, and the leaders in Washington and Peking, as well as in the capitals of major and minor powers, are thankfully, I feel, facing up to that reality.

The movement of educated young people down to the countryside has been a very important movement in China in the 1960's, in the early 60's, and we see it happening again today. What has happened is that young people, middle school grads, high school grads in big cities are being moved. One of the most remarkable examples of this is the movement of students from Shanghai all the way across the country to Sinkiang, from the most eastern point to the most western point; students are sent off to, in essence, forge a whole new life in Sinkiang. What happens when people are sent this great distance? What is the reason for this? What does it do to the urban area they left? What does it do to the area they come to? What does it do to their parents, who probably will see them only once a year or once every couple of years? What does it do to that student who is sent off to the countryside for such a long period of time, when he is used to the relatively swinging life in Shanghai?

Well, for one thing it does alleviate strains on the urban economy, and this must be an important reason for sending the students out. For another, it puts Han Chinese in areas of heavy minority occupation particularly those along the border of the Soviet Union, for instance in Sinkiang. It carries literate people to areas where the literacy rate is not as high as in the cities, and students can do a certain amount of teaching of Chinese characters in their spare time, if not a full-time occupation, when they are working out in the countryside on commune soil reclaiming land or working in mountainous areas. It also puts new manpower into rural areas, and, very importantly, it puts dirt under the fingernails of students who otherwise would not have it there. It

gets relatively spoiled high school grads from the big cities, into the countryside, into the soil.

It has been mentioned on more than one occasion that about eighty percent of the people of China are peasants. China is predominately an agricultural country, and it is felt by the leadership that it is very important to have youth have a rural experience, to know what it is to farm, what it is to know a peasant. It is very important for a future cadre to have experience with peasants, so that he is able to communicate with peasants, to speak their language, know what it is to farm, to plant and harvest according to the moon, and experience the sorts of things that one has no contact with when one lives in a huge city of ten million people like Shanghai.

What happens in the countryside when this band of newcomers comes in—kids who have never pushed a plow, kids who really might not have been living in utter splendor, but on the other hand, really have forgotten what a dirt floor is like, what sleeping on a k'ang (bed with coals underneath in the winter) is like, what this sort of existence is like? It is difficult for those in the countryside, I am sure, because they are getting in these spoiled people, not only people who have to be trained to do all these kinds of things, but people who are also going to be extra mouths to feed and might be rabble-rousers, because you know they are going to tell all the people in the countryside what the bright lights are like, and they are going to try to get out of as much as they can, and they might be a pretty difficult bunch to handle. So you can imagine, initially, the head of the commune, or the head of the brigade is not particularly happy about seeing this great mass of newcomers coming in. It takes quite a bit of adjustment, on both sides, to get used to the idea of this new group of people and for that new group of people to get used to the idea of being there and devoting themselves to that type of life.

For the parents in Shanghai, or Peking, or Nanch'ang, or any city of any size, it is a difficult thing to see their child go off hundreds and hundreds or thousands of miles away. It is not easy to get back to the city; they are not encouraged to come back to the city. At Chinese New Years each year, they probably can come each year, if they are not that far away. I really do not know if a student who is all the way over on the other side of the country does get back every year; I would imagine that it is possible that he does not. It is a difficult process, and we saw during the cultural revolution, that many students took the excuse of going to exchange revolutionary experiences in the cities to come back to Sinkiang, to come back from far-flung areas, back to the bright lights for some period of time. But now a concerted effort is being made to get students

from the cities back down to the countryside. I think it is a useful experience for the students involved; it is a useful experience for those on the receiving end as well.

In the foreign policy area, which my husband spoke about, I want to talk to you for a couple of seconds about the foreign policy establishment, because we had some conversations with people from the foreign policy establishment in Peking. Delegates from our organization, The U.S. Committee For A New China Policy, were guests of something called the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, which is a semi-official organization very closely aligned with the ministry of foreign affairs. We had a very long conversation one day about foreign policy making in the U.S. Obviously, in a situation of this sort when you are being asked a lot of questions, you can tell quite a bit about the questioners by what they ask you. And we discovered, in the course of all this, many things which dispel many myths which we in the West have had about China and about people in power—how much they really know about the West, how much they really know about America.

Going to China dispels many myths heard in the West. We found that people in the foreign policy establishment are quite well-versed about the U.S. Most speak, read, and understand English quite well, particularly reading and understanding; I think comprehension is very high, and many speak quite good English. The New York Times and other American publications are avidly read in China. I think that we should remember that China has had embassies in many countries in the West in the past, and of course these are increasing all the time. Thus there has been access to articles on the U.S. and access to American magazines, in addition to those already subscribed to in Peking. So the foreign policy establishment in Peking is quite well-versed, quite, quite up on what is going on in the U.S. They know what the situation in China scholarship is on U.S. and Canadian campuses. When discussing U.S. and foreign policy making the conversations were very sophisticated; we had the feeling that their knowledge about the U.S. is really quite good—at least among high and mid-level officials.

Now we come to the whole business of orthodoxy handed down from Peking, which again is very fascinating to me, particularly the didactic aspects of leadership in China. I often feel that we could use a bit more of this didactic aspect in our own leadership in the U.S. The whole business of moral leadership, from the center, from the top-most rung of the ladder, is to me one which we do not get quite as much of in the U.S. as I think we need, and I think it is a very necessary thing in leading a big country. But we find this happening in China.

However, another myth which this experience has dispelled—it had begun to be dispelled right and left during the cultural revolution—is the whole notion that the running of the country is very tight, very prearranged, unresponsive to public opinion. In fact, though it might, ideally, be very nice if it was all tight and pre-arranged, the center is responsive to public opinion. There is an interaction between high and low, between Mao Tse-tung and other leaders of Peking, and the provinces, cities, and towns below. For example, we know that people in Shanghai took the lead in shaping the cultural revolution in many of its twists and turns. And many of those people, because of this have moved into prominent positions in Peking. We know that the excesses after the turning on of the red guards during the cultural revolution led to the need to turn them off and in this process the PLA, Peoples Liberation Army, was introduced as a peace-keeping and policy making

force; and that was a necessary thing during that time. Now there is a move to send them, in essence, back to the barracks and to put policy-making and policy realization back into the hands of civilians, back into the hands of the party and government figures.

Mao has had a way of seeing how much of his program, his ideals he could get people to bear. I am not speaking for Mao, but I think he probably feels that the important thing is the inching forward. Mao knows China better than anyone does. He understands how much of the old lives on in China. And lots and lots of the old does live on—not only in terms of old roads, and the great wall, and the forbidden city, but old habits, old customs, old ways of looking at the world; these things remain, and he knows that. And he realizes how the surge into the 20th century often must go at a crawl. But even a crawl is movement, and I think, to Mao, the important thing is movement.

POLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA, PROJECTIONS INTO THE FUTURE

By: Lois Dougan Tretiak

At nine o'clock on November 1, 1971 the Chinese Embassy in Ottawa rang my husband, who at that time was co-chairman of the U.S. Committee for a New China Policy, to tell him that a delegation of our committee had been invited to visit the People's Republic of China. That was the beginning of two months of negotiations forming a delegation. You can imagine the problems. Just think of any group you belong to and try to imagine what it would be like if that group was invited to take a trip to China today and you had to pick say five or seven people from that group to go. You can imagine what sort of things would ensue, so you can understand why it took us two months to form our delegation.

Finally, on January 12th we entered China and left on February 12th—both in and out via Canton. Our organization, incidentally, is a national one whose primary job is one of education and lobbying to convince both the White House and other policy-makers in Washington, plus the American people, that we should recognize the government in Peking as the sole legitimate government of China and that the Taiwan problem should be settled by the Chinese on both sides of the straits.

We were invited to China as guests of the Chinese People's Institute for Foreign Affairs. It is a semi-official organization, closely aligned with the ministry of foreign affairs. We were the first group of

Americans invited to China by this group and therefore we probably had more access to foreign policy-makers, people in the foreign policy establishment in Peking, than perhaps we would have had otherwise. We visited Canton, Peking, Shanghai, and the Kiangsi cities of P'inghsiang, Anyuan, and Nanch'ang. We were in Peking for sixteen days, primarily because we were waiting to be received by Prime Minister Chou En-lai.

Then we went to Shanghai and Kiangsi Province for the remainder of the trip. We traveled some 2,000 miles by train. We were on the train for a total of seventy-two hours and therefore we did have a good opportunity to see the countryside.

Chinese people and leaders today are taking a long hard look at their post-cultural revolution society and experimenting, evaluating, and adjusting. I must comment before I go any further that one has the feeling that China is in the process of change, of movement, of evolution. We particularly felt this, after comparing our experiences of January-February this year with Bernie's experiences of the summer of 1971. Various things had changed by the time we arrived in January-February, one of those being the presence of the military in cities. Bernie saw many more members of the Peoples Liberation Army doing a vast array of civil roles, whereas by the time we had come they already were being phased-out of many organizations, universities, various

things. We did not see nearly as many in various major cities as Bernie's group had seen previously.

This was just one of the senses of change which we had in comparing our experiences with people who had been there earlier. People in China today appear diligent and determined but also at ease with their world, which you were probably able to note from looking at Nixon's trip on TV. This particularly characterizes ordinary people, the man on the street.

High level leaders are relaxed, confident, and articulate about their country's long history, about its present strides and future prospects. You have the feeling that people on various leadership levels are particularly endowed with a sense of history. I remember a very high-ranking person talking to us about the importance of our country making foreign policy for ten years in advance, twenty years in advance, yea fifty years in advance, he said. Then he would talk about the past fifty years or so of history in this country and China, and I thought about this. When you come from a country with thousands of years of continuous history it is relatively easy to think in terms of the next fifty, the next one hundred, and the next two hundred years. When you come from one with such a short history as ours, it is a bit more difficult to have this kind of perspective. However, we Americans might as well have confidence that we are going to be around for awhile and start thinking in those long-range terms.

Some middle-level and lower-level cadres appear more wary, harried, and harrassed. They are concerned that bad impressions might be given of various things in China, but after all it is they who must deal with the nuts and bolts of everyday life in China, and so they would be more harried, more concerned for they are dealing with daily problems. Those cadres who could be described as quite up-tight were actually a minority. I think back, and I can remember some who were a bit more concerned, more frightened of something going wrong, but they were a minority.

I think a key to understanding China today at all levels is the pride in China's accomplishments one senses in everyone. There is pride in regional achievements, for example, locally made machinery. People are very proud of not only the fact that the particular machine was made in China but that it was made in their particular province. My husband and I speak Chinese; four of the six members of our group spoke Chinese, which was quite helpful. We would go into a factory, and I would look at name plates madly to see where things had been built. They were virtually all built in China, in places we visited. I would see a particular one and say to a man in Kwangtung (I remember this particularly), "It was made in Chengchow, huh?" "No! No! It was made in Kwangtung Province!" This pride in provincial accomplishment, in local accomplishment, in

regional accomplishment was very great. And people over forty years old can feel pride about the immense strides forward China has taken in the last twenty-two years. There is this tremendous sense of *tzu-li keng-sheng*, of self-reliance. Those four characters are seen all over China, particularly on the communes and in the factories. The spirit which these four characters connote, self-reliance, is very important.

I am not an economist, but certain things appeared clear to me from recent observations. The vast majority of rural land is owned and worked by the collective, but such things as private plots, private raising of pigs, and free markets are flourishing facts of life in the countryside. Earnings are less in the countryside than in the cities, but the income from the private plot seems to act as an equalizer between the farmer and the factory worker.

Self-reliance is much more than a slogan. Near absolute independence seems to be the goal, and every Chinese is proud of each piece of evidence that China is moving closer to that goal. There is great pride in Chinese made machinery, vehicles, medicines made in communes and schools, in new strains of pigs developed in China; all of these things are sources of great pride. A high-level official said to us more than once that China should give medals to the Soviet Union and the United States for the negative economic measures which those two countries have placed in China's way for the last twelve to fifteen years, because these have forced China to do it on its own, and it has been a very important, emotional thing. I think it has been a very important thing in the business of nation building that people have this sense of having to go it on their own; it has been a very important force in Chinese society.

This spirit of self-reliance is so evident in China. It is constantly mentioned, and you can feel it and see it wherever you go. Therefore, I was appalled when Andre Malraux talked to Nixon before Nixon went to China and told him there was a very good possibility that the Chinese were going to ask for great masses of aid. Well, it just seemed one had to begin suspecting everything Malraux had said in the past, if he came up with that kind of judgement at this very critical time. In fact, it just seemed impossible that China would come to Nixon for aid in those terms. The Chinese pay for what they buy whether it is a big plant, sugar from Brazil, or rubber from Ceylon; they pay for these things.

Long-term credit perhaps could be interpreted as aid of a sort. Extending long-term credit to China has been under debate in such countries as Japan and will probably come under debate in the United States, but it is an area which the Chinese have managed to do without, by and large, and to continue on relatively short-term credit and to pay quickly. International traders, be

they English, Italian, or from other countries, are always saying the Chinese pay on time for what they buy, under whatever particular conditions were set in the agreement, and in pounds sterling or whatever currency is stipulated. Therefore, I was more than a little appalled by those remarks of Malraux.

Meanwhile, there is much evidence that industry is being carried to the suburbs and far into the countryside. I do not want to belabor this, but I do think it is an important and significant thing. There are many factors; much of the particularisms that Dr. Morgan speaks about still exist today in China. Ideally, this will be controlled with the advent of better communications, but the fact is that particularisms still do exist to a great degree

in the country. But there is also a conscious policy by the government to move industry out into the countryside as far as possible from the cities. Now this decentralization of industry may, in fact, lead to a breaking down of the particularism, may, in fact, lead to more national integration, more of a feeling of nationhood, more of a oneness because as industry is extended it takes with it electricity, roads, better communications, telephones, the whole thing. Thus, communes and villages in areas near those factories are brought into 20th century China at a more rapid rate than they would otherwise be, and the ability to get directives from the center down to the countryside is enhanced by this movement of the factories out to the countryside.

CHINESE HIGHER EDUCATION

By: Lois Dongan Tretiak

There are few areas of life in China today that I feel have felt the impact of the cultural revolution more profoundly than education. Because you are basically a college audience and are interested in what is going on in education in the United States, you also may be interested in education in China. One of Mao's concerns in launching the cultural revolution was his determination to save China from the flabbiness he saw in Soviet and East European communism—from the increasing devotion to consumerism and the growing manifestations of individualism in those societies.

Where better to begin to prevent this type of thing in China than among China's youth. Furthermore, it was perceived, youth could be purified in the act of purification. Thus, in the early days of the cultural revolution, the call was to "smash the old and establish the new," thereby involving the youth in the eradication of seemingly capitalist influences from the society. The attacks on life style: long hair, pointy shoes, tight slacks, that sort of thing, outward shows of wealth—these kinds of attacks moved into struggles against people in the party who were prone to less than pure Maoist communism. They were called "capitalist roaders"; the leading one was said to be Liu Shao-Ch'i. These people were rooted out, struggles against, criticized, and repudiated.

In the midst of these campaigns were the students. College campuses became major ideological battlefields and in 1966 classes stopped. To the Maoists this in itself was, at least initially, not a bad thing. For, in their view, education had become increasingly elitist. A high percentage of the university student body was the chosen party elite. It was urban and it had no work experience.

Furthermore, the Maoists saw education developing tendencies toward excessive attention to books and theoretical knowledge and a virtual exclusion of activities relating the classroom to society and to the building of the country. All this in a developing country. And we must always remember this about China, it is a developing country of 750 to 800 million people—80 to 85% of whom are rural dwellers. We also have to remember that China is basically, in terms of land, the same size as we are—Counting Hawaii and Alaska—but it has much less cultivatable land. And so the problems are manifold with the greater population.

The cultural revolution then really took shape among the youth in school. It stopped classes as it gathered speed and its ramifications still very significantly influence Chinese society. Today, three and a half years after what we can date as the end of the cultural revolution in late 1968, people are beginning to talk now about the cultural revolution more or less in the past tense. For all intents and purposes it is over as the phenomenon that it was during the 1966 to 68 period. But, I am convinced that there are aspects of the cultural revolution—the problems and ideological conflicts involved—that are still being fought out today on various levels. And I think this is going on particularly in education. Higher education is in a state of experimentation, evaluation, and adjustment. As the Chinese say, "summing up of experience". As the leader of one of the five higher education institutions we visited put it, his school was in the process of "struggle, criticism, transformation". All of the five institutions we visited gave this impression of struggle, criticism, transformation, although his institution, The Institute of Physical

Culture, was unique in the fact that he said it was still “groping its way in the sports revolution”.

Three of the five schools we visited were in Peking: Pei-ta (Peking University), the Institute of Physical Culture which I just mentioned, and the Central Nationalities Institute which was a very interesting experience and, I believe, reasonably significant. Classes had just begun at that institute in late December 1971. Very few Westerners have visited it; it is a very key one strategically and politically in China today. We visited one in Canton, the Kwangtung Normal College, and one in Nanch'ang, the Kiangsi Communist Labor University which with that long title you figure is going to be a very intense place for some ideological training, but in fact, it is really an agricultural university with several campuses around the province—probably like Penn State or one of the Big Ten schools, a really good agricultural school with extensions around the state.

The three universities enrolled their first classes since the cultural revolution in late 1970—Pei-ta, the agricultural school, and the normal school. The Physical Culture Institute and The Central Nationalities Institute enrolled their first classes in 1971. In all instances the enrollments were down and what seems very obvious is that the enrollments are very slowly being built up again. Pei-ta (Peking University) enrolled 1,000 students in late 1970. The following year it enrolled about 200 and these were mainly in foreign languages and math. With this kind of situation, you can feel a sense of groping and trying to see where they are going in education and the reason for this I feel must be a continuing discussion, a continuing attempt by those on either end of the spectrum to push the pendulum closer to their own feeling. But what will probably happen is that the pendulum will be brought closer to the center again after prolonged discussion.

There will be changes in post-cultural revolution education. Some of these will be in the area of new admissions requirements, the establishment of farms and workshops on the campus to combine theory with practice, the whole business of bringing the outside in. They are bringing peasants, workers, PLA men onto the campus to lecture to the students about things the “guest speakers” are very well acquainted with. It is very interesting. We asked, “Do the peasants come in and discuss political things with the students?” They replied, “No, other people do that. They come in and discuss farming, farm equipment, things of this sort.” Apparently the people coming in from the outside are sticking to their specialities, and political courses are taught by people more schooled in political thought.

The new approach to education involves the idea of going out to aid the community, students going from the factories to do productive labor, the Physical Culture Institute reaching out to bring in young students from Peking to come in and do ping pong, gymnastics, swimming, all sorts of things in the absolutely fine facilities of the Institute.

The new approach also involves teaching techniques. The Chinese are speaking of new, greater student participation in the presentation of lectures, the give and take between professors and students as being quite different and new. And they are very happy about this. The four academicians in our group were somewhat astounded because we, of course, had been going through this kind of a process of more and more student involvement in the actual makeup of classes, in teaching those classes, in making contributions to them. We are going through this process in the U.S. and have been for some time now and hopefully pushing it to new heights. But in China that is quite a new thing, it is really being done now, in 1970, 71, 72. But to what degree students really are playing a prominent part in education is a very difficult thing to know. One has the feeling that there is still a great amount of rote learning which takes place in China at the university level, and the long history of this kind of learning, also the long history of the gap between the professor and the student, have to be reformed. And that too, I think, will be a gradual process in China.

Several differences of opinion exist today in China about higher education. The amount of time to be devoted to classroom study and the amount of time for productive labor is being debated. There are those who would have the students in class all the time with the books. There are others who would have them off in the countryside probably ninety percent of the time working and maybe a bit of time devoted to books. And so there are problems, each side wants more of the pie. But slowly, slowly a more equitable situation will evolve and probably satisfy each side to some degree but neither side completely.

The length of time to devote to a particular course of study is a very significant area of discussion in China today, for example, how much time should be devoted to training of doctors. When people in higher education with western training or training in Chinese schools set up or influenced by westerners are confronted by great masses of young people and by other people in the system who say education should be this, this, and this, so there is a difficulty, a sort of generational difficulty in working out problems. I have the feeling that the time will be stretched out and probably return to almost its previous length.

There is the problem among some people of whom to serve. I think for some people in China, particularly those people who major in swimming and minor in eight other sports, this is a difficult question. When so many other people in the society are working on a daily basis serving the people, serving the state, and they are there swimming each day, it must really be a source of some concern that they are not quite doing for the country what the next man is doing. Just to comment, an athlete in China does not pursue sports for great purses and great endorsements of Pepsi Cola. Instead he pursues sports for building of good bodies, for uplifting the general level of health around the country, for training young people, and for representing China in international competition. If these young people keep these goals in mind, they can,

to some degree, cope with what can be a very important question of whom to serve.

In the area of enrollment procedures and background of the enrollees, there is a concerted effort to get students into the schools and universities who come from peasant background, worker background, or children of army men. Graduate study and foreign student enrollment seem to be under discussion. At the moment Peking University does not offer graduate courses, but it is likely they will in the future. But on the question of foreign student enrollment, they say "Well, we just do not know about that yet." I would imagine it is going to occur again. I truly do not think it will come very soon, but we may all have a chance to do a course or two at Pei-ta before we are too old.

WOMAN'S ROLE IN CHINESE SOCIETY

By: Daniel Tretiak

When we look at the role of women in Chinese society today I think the first thing we must determine is what are we looking at, what are the standards, what is the bench mark? From whence does the status of women in Chinese society derive? Is it fair to judge standards of what women's roles are in Chinese society against what those roles are in western society? Or had we better try to look at it from within Chinese society? The answer is very obvious. It is very presumptuous intellectually, I think dishonest, to look at it from a western standpoint; better look at it fully within the Chinese context.

What had the role of women been in Chinese society before the 1911 revolution; what had it been before the revolution of 1949; and what has it been after 1949? What has been happening to women in China essentially in the 20th century? It has been a liberating period. It has been in effect, a women's liberation movement developing slowly, maybe not as fast as some people in China or in the West might like, but it has been developing since the turn of the century when women started to play very active roles in the politics of China. As an example, a woman was involved in attempts to assassinate Manchu dynasty officials before the Manchu dynasty finally fell in 1908. This evidenced a high degree of political consciousness, a high degree of commitment to revolutionary change, and other women very quickly became involved in the process of political change within China.

After the fall of the Manchu dynasty, one of the movements which started to develop in China was the communist movement. If you go back and read some of Mao Tse-tung's early writings and look at his early revolutionary experiences in Hunan province, Mao was very actively interested in seeing that women broke the shackles of the past, that women would no longer be subservient to men as they had been in previous society. The move against foot binding became a very popular one throughout China, in some ways even before the fall of the Manchu dynasty, but quickly thereafter became very prevalent. The Chinese communist movement fully endorsed a stronger and more equalitarian role for women throughout Chinese politics. In so doing, the Chinese communist movement and the whole of Chinese society which argued for an upgrading of the status of women was clearly responding to western influences as to what the role of women ought to be. I dare say, and this is not a pitch for western imperialism or anything of that sort, if there had not been an influence of the west on Chinese society in the early 20th century, there would not have been change in the status of the women. There was an input from the outside; it did influence what happened within China; it has continued to influence what happens in China with regard to women; and I think it is influencing—right now—what is happening to women in Chinese society.

I do not think China can avoid being judged by western standards, by western inputs if you will, as to what the status of women ought to be, even though one should better judge how Chinese women progress from a Chinese standpoint rather than from a western one. But, let this be clear, emancipation of women, to give women a fair share in all aspects of Chinese life, has not only been a goal of the communist revolution. It has been a goal for the whole process of Chinese modernization whether it is practiced in Taiwan under the Nationalists or the People's Republic under the Communists.

Let me try to sketch out some characteristics of women in contemporary Chinese society today—these are very impressionistic based on thirty-one days in China as well as a little bit of reading about the subject. It is clear that women do have a very important role in Chinese society, and I do not mean just as the producers of progeny to add to the population. They do many things. Women are very prominent in education, more at the lower levels, primary school and to a certain extent the secondary school, than necessarily at the university. But even at major universities, such as Peking University, there are quite prominent women faculty members, although I am sure they are a minority of the faculty. If you want to judge that against western standards, according to data that I have heard, the number of women in university positions in the United States has actually declined over time rather than increased. So if you want to judge it that way, Chinese women are not doing that much worse or that much better; they are involved in all levels of education including the highest levels at the leading university, Peking University, where they teach political subjects, language subjects, and I suspect science subjects, although I did not speak with female science professors.

Women also are very actively involved in manual labor. It is clear that they work in communes doing agricultural work; they pick crops along side men, and they also work on the docks at Shanghai. While they do not necessarily lift heavy boxes and the like, they run the trucks that carry things from one place to another. They drive them like, pardon me, like women drive cars all over the world, a little bit crazy—sorry for that male chauvinist view. They drive very fast and hard, very enthusiastically. And they are very much involved in the process of running the docks. They are involved in the political organization and management of the facility we visited.

One very interesting afternoon we went to a dock in Shanghai expecting to make a quick run through and then do some shopping because it was the only afternoon we thought we might be able to squeeze in an hour's worth of shopping. The dock is run by older men, in their 50's and 60's, but we had a meeting in which some young people attended. Of the young people, two of the three happened to be women. I should not say happened to be; they were very much involved in the process of how the dock is run, who gets this particular assignment, what are the rules of running the dock, etc., etc. They were clearly unhappy with the fact that the men were telling us certain things, and they did not agree with what the men were telling us. So they were arguing with the older men, and we had one of the clearest examples of the generation gap, and also a gap between male and female. The women were far more activist, it

seemed to us, and far more interested in keeping things changing, keeping the process, if you will, of the cultural revolution going on. The men just wanted to get the job done. The women exhibited a far greater degree of political activism, political consciousness than some of their elders. In one case, a woman was in charge of determining who did what particular task on the dock which turned out to be a major function in the running of the dock.

Women are also very active in medical work; a lot of doctors are women. They also are in paramedical work in clinics and hospitals and on communes. It is women who are very actively involved in birth control propagation efforts. They go out to different households in communes and encourage women to start practicing birth control. That is a major function in the medical field.

What about in the political realm? That is a problem that concerns western women, and it may concern Chinese women, although we are not sure how concerned they are about it. Some Chinese women say that it is not a major concern for them. They are interested in class relations. They are not interested in male/female relations as a major political issue. But I am not quite convinced that it is all that simple. I think that there are latent tensions within Chinese society extant between males and females. Although the norm of Chinese society is that there is equal pay for equal work regardless of sex, I think that there may be instances in which this is not really operational in practice. And I think there may be cases in which women are not entirely happy about it, although no Chinese women explicitly indicated this to us.

It is also true that women get a pretty good deal when they are pregnant and the birth of a child is eminent. They get paid for a fairly long period of time at their regular wage. And they also get paid if they decide they do not want to have a child and want to go through an abortion process; they are paid for the period when the abortion takes place and the recovery period afterward. So women may not be getting all the benefits of males in terms of wages, yet they get certain benefits as well.

Women also tend not to do the heaviest work in a particular profession, that is left to the men. Therefore, women get a lower wage because the heavier the work the higher the wage. If you do light work in a given area, you get less work points, but heavier work is left to the men. Now some women may say, I can really handle the heaviest job around here. Maybe they can, and this may still be a latent form of discrimination against women saying, well you really can not do lifting of heavy things. And women may be saying, we really can, we want ten work points for today; we do not want to just get eight; we want the full level.

In the political realm itself, you have to look at several different levels. Plagiarizing from my wife—if you give a source, I guess it is not plagiarism—my wife says that in the Eighth Central Committee four percent of all members were women; in the Ninth Central Committee elected in April of 1969 eight percent were women. That is an increase of one hundred percent. Whether that is a reflection of certain demands that were put on the political system during the cultural revolution or just a natural process in which women, for idiosyncratic reasons, were more qualified for holding these positions, we are not really sure. But it is clear from the public data that women increased one hundred percent on the central committee which is the highest political organ in China that is really operative today.

Within the foreign policy establishment, from rather high levels across to the interpreter/translator level, women play a very important role. I think that in the Chinese foreign policy establishment, perhaps more than in any other country—West or East—women play a very significant role in making policy as well as in carrying it out. I think probably the only exception that immediately comes to my mind is Cuba, where women play a very major role in all kinds of decision-making given the rather inbred nature of the Cuban national political elite. But, that is a very exceptional case. In China, women within the foreign policy process are deputy heads of sections dealing with different areas of the world. One woman, until she died, was a very high official close to Chou En-lai in the area of foreign policy. Women are sort of scattered throughout the listings of people manning the important positions. For example, at the United Nations, the wife of ambassador Huang Hua, Madame Ho Li-liang, holds the rank of counselor, and she holds it because of her own achievement criteria not because she is Huang Hua's wife. She can handle a lot of roles very effectively; she is an impressive public speaker, and I am sure a very efficient and competent diplomat. They happen to be somewhat unique, as far as I know, there is no other case within the Chinese foreign-policy establishment where both the husband and wife are assigned to one post. But you have women playing lots of roles in foreign policy processes. Our best translator, for example, happened to be a woman from Shanghai.

I think one of the real shortcomings in the political process in terms of female participation occurs further down in the system at local institutions. Perhaps the worse possible case, and I use this as a worse possible case in no way as a norm, occurred at a neighborhood factory that we visited in Peking. It was set up by women to make some kind of instrument that is far beyond my technical competence to

describe, a diffusion furnace, whatever that is. They set this factory up. It started out as a rather elementary one; then it became a rather sophisticated one. All the workers were women with the exception of a stray male here or there who had managed to get into the thing. But when we visited the factory, we were met in the reception room by a bunch of men, like six or seven men who were the revolutionary committee—really the party committee. We found out who the elite structure was, the governing structure, and it turned out that it was the people who met us—the men. The only woman who was a member of the revolutionary committee of this particular institution was in the room and had the great and dubious honor of serving us tea. She did not sit at the table and participate in discussions about how to run the factory; the men did that. We were a bit uncomfortable about that and one of us males said, “What kind of a deal is this? The whole factory is operated by women and yet, in terms of governance, women seem to be cut out of the action.” And that caused a lot of problems; we never got a real answer to that. They said, “Well some of the women who are on the revolutionary committee just could not make it this afternoon, they were doing other things.” They did not need baby-sitting, they have day-care centers so the women could have come. We had the distinct impression that it was really a male-chauvinist hangout of the worst sort. The women were doing the work, but the assignments of work, the governance of the factory was still left to males. We were, quite frankly, a bit annoyed by this progress. We could not understand it, and we never got a straight answer as to why at least half of the people who administered the factory were not women. One would have thought that would have been fair even by Chinese standards—not by western standards. So I think that there are certain times when you throw away your western values, examine the process of women and their roles in Chinese society and make your judgement from the Chinese standpoint, and then you still find a little bit wanting here and there. That is an extreme example.

When we would visit a local institution, whether it be a commune, a university, a middle school, a factory, or whatever, we would ask the responsible comrades at that particular institution to describe the makeup of the leadership of the personnel in terms of several categories: Were there old, middle, or young cadres; were there representatives of the workers, the masses, the PLA; how many were men and how many were women? Rarely, if ever, did women make up a majority of the leadership structure of a particular institution, at best they were large minorities. The Chinese admit that this is still a problem, and they ask us to judge them against their own particular background in which women did have

an inferior role prior to the 20th century in the political processes. I think that is the way we have to do it. We have to make, in essence, a kind of allowance. We have to judge how far things have gone, how far they still have to go, and recognize progress.

Going from this very heavy political business, let us talk about the birds and the bees, about male-female relations. First of all, there is plenty of birth control being advocated and, I suspect, really being practiced in China today. It is particularly aimed at women, although vasectomies are being advocated for men, although I do not think with very much success in Chinese society (which is not unique for any society in the world); men just do not seem to want to participate in that for reasons of their own male chauvinist hang-ups. And so the women are the ones, the beneficiaries or what have you, of birth control processes. Everything is available: pills, diaphragms, and injections.

What about pre-marital sex? That is a question in western society; it is one we were very reluctant to raise in China. We finally got up the courage to do this at one commune, because the discussion about male-female relations, on the sexual level, became very frank and open. It was readily admitted that there had been cases of pre-marital sex resulting in pregnancy. So we asked the comrades, "Well, what do you do when this particular situation develops?" They said, "We make them get married. No if's, and's, or but's, we tell them, you have to get married." I do not think that an abortion occurs in those particular cases; they have to get married because it is not proper to have children out of wedlock. It is the functional equivalent of a "shotgun wedding". The comrade was very frank in saying that this was the situation—not a rampant problem, but he did not deny that it existed. We found that rather candid and refreshing.

You are told it is hard to differentiate between males and females in China, they all dress alike. It is not that hard. It is a little more difficult in the winter time than in the summer time because everyone wears padded jackets which cover up a bit of everything. But if you look with any degree of closeness you can pick out males from females.

When you go to Shanghai, it is very clear that public demonstrations of affection, which are not supposed to be seen in China, are extant. Therefore, it was very surprising for me and two of my friends to start walking the streets of Shanghai our first evening there and within five minutes, see five or six couples holding hands standing in little corners doing what couples do when they hold hands. It was very refreshing; it happens in China. I do not say this to be derogatory about China, at least it is a visible part of the scene. One does not see

it in Peking because Peking is a bit of a stuffy city, and Shanghai is a great international city. I do not say it is a corrupt city. From the best I have ever been able to learn, there is no prostitution anymore in Shanghai, but there is still certainly an influence of the West, a more easier way of life, less social pressure for a very rigid, puritanical ethic than exists in Peking. So it is kind of natural, couples holding hands without anyone bothering them. There are also fewer public security bureau people in Shanghai which may also have something to do with it.

What about the future role of women in China? Two or three years from now when visitors to local level institutions ask how many men and how many women are on the party committee (the revolutionary committee), if there still are revolutionary committees, they will find a mild increase in the percentage and ratios. I think this will be so because China is part of the world, and Chinese institutions that are visited by foreigners will be asked constantly, what the role of women is because it is an original goal of the Chinese revolution that women have an equal role in Chinese society. In effect, Chinese are going to be called upon by the rest of the world, and I think subtly by women within China, to measure-up to the goals of the revolution which include giving women a bigger piece of the political action. I think there also is going to be pressure to eliminate differentiations in wages and working conditions.

The last day that we spent in China was in Kwangchow (Canton), at what is called a May 7th Cadre School. It is an institution set up for cadres, that is leading functionaries, who are undergoing ideological reform. That institution's leading responsible person was a woman. To the best of my recollection it was the first time I had visited an institution in China in which the leading responsible person was a woman. I was very pleased and also a bit surprised to see this occur. In the car on the way back to our guest house in Canton, I said to our translator, a woman, "You know this is rather good, I thought it was right and proper that women should be leading, responsible people in institutions, and it was refreshing to see. It took thirty-one days, but at least we saw one run by a woman. I think some day women are going to be pushing for equality in China." She got very up-tight and said, "We have equality right now. It is prescribed by law." And I said, "I come from a society which also has a lot of things prescribed by law, and I like to see them carried out and practiced. Then I know that the laws are really being obeyed. And some day I would not be surprised if you are going to have some of these questionings about equal rights between the men and women." And she said, "No, No, No! It is not going to happen." (continued on bottom of page 20)



K. Polcyn



W. Fisher



W. Greenough
(F. Bachrach)

GUEST ARTICLE

THE

By: Dr. William C. Greenough

About Our Authors

Bruce Morgan, professor and chairman of the department of religion at Amherst College at the time of the Colloquium, was a missionary in Shanghai, Peking, and other Chinese cities during the hectic years between the end of World War II and the end of the Communist revolution. He has taught at numerous American schools and has maintained an avid interest in China.

B. Michael Frolic, now a professor of political science at York University in Toronto, was a Harvard Russian Research Center Fellow when he participated in the colloquium. He spent a month in China in 1965 and 1971 and had been an exchange student in Moscow in 1964-65. The Ph.D. candidate at Cornell speaks Chinese, Russian, and German and has had articles in the *New York Times* and *American Political Science Preview*.

Daniel Tretiak, lecturer in political science at Toronto's York University and research associate on the IREA Project at Cornell this summer, has been to China several times. He and Mrs. Tretiak, on a month's visit, were with the last group to talk to Chou En-lai before President Nixon's visit. The Ph.D. candidate at Stanford was formerly Senior Political Scientist—Advanced Studies Group, Westinghouse Corporation. He is co-chairman of the "U.S. Committee for a New China Policy".

Lois Dougan Tretiak is editor at Harvard's East Asian Research Center and a free lance writer for Harvard East Asia Legal Studies. She has visited Chinese institutions of higher education on their trips to China. She and Dan both speak Chinese. Lois formerly edited the *Far Eastern Economic Review* published in Hong Kong.

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THE KEY REPORTER
PHI BETA KAPPA

Tomorrows are cascading in upon us. There are times when the problems of today and the unsolved ones of yesterday overwhelm us enough, without our thinking of tomorrow's difficulties. But to some extent, we are always in tomorrow. Alvin Toffler's *Future Shock* warns of a society *spinning out of control*, a "change-dazed government", a geometric rate of change that overwhelms out social institutions and ourselves as individuals.

And yet, I think we shall make it to the twenty-first century and, just possibly, beyond. I am less alarmed and more hopeful about the next thirty years, even with our backlog and prologue of problems, than I was in August of 1945, facing the quarter century that would follow Hiroshima.

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But, a couple of weeks later Madame Soong Ching-ling (Sun Yat-sen's widow and a Vice-president of China) had a long article in *Peking Review* in effect saying, "While we do have these things in law, there are many a slip between the cup and the lip. It is not all our there as it ought to be, and we do have work to be done." I thought about our very distinguished and excellent interpreter. Maybe she thought there was no real discrimination in her occupation, that she got equal wages for equal work. Or maybe she just was not clued-in to the latest line and the line really now was, "Yes, we have to lay it our straight. Women really are not getting full equality. This foolish barbarian is right in seeing that there are some problems." I think these problems will be dealt with.

And I think that this lady did make a very good point which showed how much she knew of women liberation movements in the west when she said, "I make it clear that we have equal wages for equal work in China. Here, women are never going to be 'sex symbols'." I think she is probably right.

INDEPENDENT SECTOR

In 1945 we worried about whether *science* was spinning out of control, Robert Oppenheimer said, "The physicist has known sin," and we knew what he meant. Now our concern is that our social instruments have "gone random", that we do not know how to cope with our most pressing human problems, that we are fast destroying our environment, that we are overpopulating our earth at a frightening pace.

The difficulty seems to be with our political and social institutions: a paralysis of effective action at all levels, an inability to mobilize our resources for the tasks at hand, a confusion as to who should and who can best accomplish the jobs ahead. How do we get things done in our society? How can and should we use the resources and reserves available to us in coping with tomorrow? To whom do we listen when trying to understand how our institutions work?

Most people divide our institutions into the usual two groups, private and public or governmental and nongovernmental. This classification misses a fundamental distinction. In terms of understanding how the work of *our* society is accomplished, a division into three sectors is far more significant: the *Government Sector*—the public sphere, the state; the *Private Sector*—capitalism, free enterprise, the business world; the *Independent Sector*—a third force, neither private profit-making nor public, largely nonprofit in organization, service, rather than product, oriented.

There is abundant writing, theorizing, lore, and practical information about the governmental and the private sectors. The "struggle" between public and private enterprise is frequently joined. Each time the government extends its activities into an area theretofore considered private, charges of socialism arise.

The interface between government and private enterprise is continually being reshaped and is by no means distinct, but it is generally understood. There are two other interfaces, however, much less clearly defined or understood. These are the dividing line between the profit-making and the Independent Sector, and the line between the Independent Sector and the government.

It is the third force, the Independent Sector, that deserves far more analysis than it has yet received. Perhaps we can begin with a definition by description. Institutions in the Independent Sector are independent from the political process. They do not stand

for election, not are they controlled by the same constituency as the government. They are diverse and pluralistic. Such institutions are oriented to perform useful social functions, to cure the body or mind, to enlighten, to aid individuals in finding human dignity and a sense of meaning and fulfillment. Institutions in the Independent Sector do not have profits which they must strive to "maximize" in order to exist amicably with stockholders or to survive. Those that provide services usually must not charge full costs for them.

It would be possible, for example, to turn higher education into a profitable venture, but the resulting "market place rationing" would be wholly unacceptable in our society. Few universities, museums, symphony orchestras, or hospitals can exist without some kind of contribution or subsidy. The Independent Sector runs by an exacting set of economic rules, but not the ones that have to do with the final net profit figure that is necessary in most business and industrial situations.

The prices charged by business match up pretty well with the product sold or the service rendered. But this is not true either of government or the Independent Sector. The government obtains contributions in the form of compulsory fees, tolls, and taxes levied upon individuals and profit-making corporations. The Independent Sector seeks contributions in the form of gifts, donations, tutions, tithing, grants, and fees for services. The fact that they both need money—lots of it—to do their jobs does not mean that the government and the Independent Sector are one and the same; indeed, it results in more differences than similarities.

Nor does the term "Independent" preclude interdependence. Each of the sectors is intertwined with the others. The third force depends to a large extent upon contributions and support, sometimes in expenditures of time, which come from the private profit-making sector. In turn, it provides reinforcements for the private sector and services to it. The tax-exempt status which the government grants to so many institutions in the Independent Sector is another example of interdependence, a governmental support designed to encourage the effectiveness of that sector; so also with subsidies, tariff barriers, and public services provided to the private profitmaking sector by government. Consequently no precise delineation of the three sectors is possible. There is an amazing variety of organizational structures

in each sector. They overlap, interact, and are interdependent in multifarious ways.

Much of society's work is accomplished in the Independent Sector in those areas that cannot be done by private enterprise in pursuit of "making money", or that can't, or shouldn't, be done by government—in the field of religion, for instance. There are also activities that can be accomplished by government but are better done in the Independent Sector. Examples are pure research, experimentation, work in controversial areas, pensions and benefit programs supplemental to the basic governmental "floor", programs where only a minority has an interest, evaluation and development of standards for governmental and private institutions and programs. There is also opportunity for free-swinging and controversial social innovation, discovery, and invention in the Independent Sector.

Universities, foundations and research laboratories have been centers of such activity in the past. As society shifts its primary accent from physical growth to the solution of social and economic problems, these institutions should become even more lively sources of innovation. Business has been exceptionally inventive in the physical production of goods, but it tends to react rather than act in social fields such as housing, minority hiring, transportation, or ecology. Government, even though it seems to be leading, usually responds rather than leads, as in the civil rights field, or Social Security legislation, or medical research. Some large segments of the Independent Sector also react rather than act and are nearly impervious to change. But the sector is so diverse that it also reaches to the very frontiers of change. Witness the scientific research that led to the discovery of insulin and the cure for yellow fever, the development of high-yield mutant rice and wheat and other grains leading to the green revolution. And in times of escalating social change it has sparked studies like Gunnar Myrdal's *The American Dilemma*, has given support for crucial civil rights activities, and has led that most startling of all American experiments, the effort to provide public or private college education for more than half of the nation's young people.

The need for an Independent Sector will grow as we concentrate more on the quality of life instead of the quantity of goods, for this sector is concerned largely with services, research, and ideas. Services may be education, social welfare, charity, doctoring the body and ministering to the soul, and wide availability of cultural and recreational activities.

I stress the service orientation of the Independent Sector because this field is a rapidly growing area of America's economic and social life. In 1900, about 37 percent of the U.S. working force was engaged in

agriculture, 49 percent in industry, 13 percent in services, and 1 percent in government. By 1950, the proportions had changed to 13 percent in agriculture, 62 percent in industry, 15 percent in services, and 10 percent in government. In 1980, the probable estimates would be something like 3 percent in agriculture, 59 percent in industry, 21 percent in service enterprises, and 17 percent in government. These figures don't come with a separate classification for "Independent Sector", but the trend is clearly toward employment of national resources in those activities generally found in the Independent Sector.

The Independent Sector is composed of a vast array of organizations. There are the universities and colleges and their links, such as central college libraries, the Common Fund for Nonprofit Organizations, the Atlanta and the Claremont Colleges, TIAA-CREF (the nationwide pooling of nonprofit educational pension plans). There are university laboratories and free-standing nonprofit research organizations. And, of course, in addition there are thousands of voluntary groups of bewildering variety.

A separate category might be the grant-making foundations such as Rockefeller, Ford, and Carnegie as well as the "operating foundations" such as the Russell Sage Foundation, the Social Science Research Council, the American Council of Learned Societies, the Twentieth Century Fund, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

While I have mentioned a few well-known organizations and institutions, this should not obscure the fact that much of the independence in this sector comes from the action of "a lot of little guys" in hundreds of thousands of small groups throughout the country where many people are involved on a local level. Certainly this possibility for personal and independent action is central to any consideration of the scope and significance of the third sector.

This individual initiative and concern also raises a further and equally important question. What makes a "nonprofiteer" tick? Why does anybody become a college president these days? A minister? A public servant? Even a faculty member? Why do many effective people choose to carry on their life work in occupations where they can never earn much money, or frequently spend large amounts of their time in nonpaid charitable work? Why not work where the big prizes are?

Men are not *solely* economic men. I think that young people understand this better than my generation does. The values that many of them seek can be realized in the Independent Sector in careers of public service in such fields as ecology and legal services for the poor.

As already noted, there is also a vast amount of non-paid, voluntary effort undertaken by members of independent organizations which brings perhaps more personal satisfaction to individuals than their wage-earning jobs yield. There is a feeling of usefulness and self-realization that comes from such work that will become increasingly important as material needs are met in an affluent society. Moreover, since the Independent Sector is composed primarily of many small organizations, either free-standing or tied together through a loose national or regional confederation, it is more responsive to individual leadership and personal effort. This factor is becoming increasingly important in our complex, cybernetic, automated society of large units, and is attracting people who look for careers of service.

Substantial support for the Independent Sector comes from philanthropic giving which for the decade of the 1960s amounted to approximately \$125 billion. Of this sum, a little less than \$100 billion was given by living individuals, \$10.5 billion by individuals through their bequests, \$10.5 billion by private foundations, and \$7 billion by corporations. Government support also is of major importance. For example, the federal government has taken over financial support of much medical research through its National Institutes of Health and its National Institutes of Mental Health. For the last thirty years, it has supported the physical sciences, especially in the universities, but partly in free-standing research organizations as well. It has recently begun to provide funds to these institutions to finance some economic and social research.

Because of its very nature the Independent Sector is subject to much indifference and misunderstanding. Alan Pifer, President of Carnegie Corporation of New York, was asked, at the time that hearings were being held on the 1969 Tax Reform Bill, "Have you seen signs that such other private tax-exempt institutions as private universities, other educational organizations, are seriously threatened?" His answer is applicable to most areas of the Independent Sector, "Yes. My feeling is that there is in Washington a kind of vast indifference toward the fate of the private non-profit sector generally and, more than that, a kind of hostility to the independence of the institutions which make up this sector . . . so that . . . if the private, nonprofit sector of our national life can't somehow re-establish itself, it's going to disappear, in my opinion. I think it is very much threatened, because . . . private institutions generally are in a very perilous condition financially."

We are continually reminded about the great difficulty of getting financial support for small private colleges, of meeting the enormous deficits of

the large private universities, of achieving public support for local museums, the Community Chest, and the Red Cross. This indifference, perhaps it's a "let the government do it" attitude, has already caused some effective organizations to give up the struggle. The problem became acute last year when common stock prices and optimism plunged together.

Misunderstanding is as serious a problem as indifference. In 1969, a broad-scale attack was made on one part of the Independent Sector, the charitable foundations, and it gave every alert person serious concern. A few notorious abuses had grown up in part of the foundation world, and it was essential that they be eradicated. This was done, and it is good that it was done. But in the process, it was distressing to watch Congress, the press, and not a few citizens become preoccupied with "correcting abuses", "closing loopholes", and showing real antagonism toward philanthropy and efforts to solve social problems in the nongovernmental sector. The 4 percent tax on foundation income, passed at that time, was variously described as a penalty on the foundations, a charge for the public services that they enjoy, their contribution to public activities, a fee for regulation. But when you get right down to it, who does the 4 percent tax penalize? It doesn't penalize the donor. Nor does it "hurt" the foundation or its officers or trustees. It does, however, cut once again into the distressingly limited funds available for supporting the independent, nonprofit sector.

Other misconceptions are also prevalent such as the widespread belief that foundations have a monolithic sameness, that foundations have come to control a disproportionately high percentage of both the nation's wealth and the nation's private giving, and that foundations are guilty of widespread abuses of their financial privileges. Such misinformation and misconceptions hurt, and demonstrate that "doing good" is not wholly its own reward whether noticed or not.

The entire Independent Sector is far broader than its philanthropic part. And it is in the whole sector, not just the philanthropic part, that there is difficulty and danger. A clearer understanding is needed that there are three great sectors in American life, not just the "private" and "governmental", and that the interaction and mutual support of the three sectors is of great significance to our society.

As our emphasis in America turns more and more to quality of life, particularly in the fields of education, research, health care, science, welfare, conservation, and charity, the Independent Sector must be found ever more useful and increasing in importance.

THE EDUCATIONAL POTENTIAL OF BROADCAST SATELLITE TECHNOLOGY

By: Kenneth A. Polcyn '58 and James P. Papay



The possible use of broadcast satellite technology for educational purposes may sound a bit like science fiction to all but a few members of the educational community; however, the technology exists today and its educational potential is being explored by scientists in both the developed and developing countries. The satellite experiments that are being conducted and those which are being planned for the future may produce a new concept of education. Therefore, it behooves educators and those interested in education to be aware of the potential of the technology and to participate in the decision making that will determine how the technology will be used.

The main purpose of this article is to provide an overview of the activities where an attempt is being made to apply broadcast satellite technology to the field of education. Secondly, satellite research that is being conducted by universities and other institutions is discussed along with some possible benefits of broadcast satellites to the educational system of the United States.

Current Educational Satellite Experimentation

Currently, there are three major experiments being conducted where satellite technology is being used for educational purposes; these three separate experiments are being conducted by the State of Alaska, the University of Hawaii, and Stanford University. The largest of the three efforts is the Alaskan experiment; \$702,000 is to be spent to determine the value of transmitting education and health radio programs via a satellite to remote Alaskan villages.

The Applications Technology Satellite Series 1 (ATS-1) is being used to tie twenty-one isolated villages together and to educators in other locations with two-way radio communication. The basic educational components are instructional radio for the students and in-service teacher training. The in-service effort includes an experimental satellite university program where in-service training courses can be taken for college credit; the student effort involves a daily two-way program with an outside educator (s). Additional topics such as firearm and snowmobile safety, nutrition, and child development are to be part of the curriculum but also will be available for the adult members of the communities that are participating in the experiment. Hopefully,

the information obtained during the experiment will be useful in assessing the value of using satellites to make more of the *needed* "outside world" readily accessible to remote areas of the United States.

The University of Hawaii experiment has been testing the potential use of satellites for information exchange between universities. Using the ATS-1, the University of Hawaii is exchanging voice, teletype, and facsimile information with its Manoa Campus on Oahu and its Hilo College on Hawaii. Recently the experiment has been expanded to include other English-speaking universities in the Pacific Basin. The cost of the initial experiment was paid for by the University of Hawaii, but the expenses for the expanded experiment are being shared by all of the universities involved, however no data is currently available on the cost of the experiment.


In cooperation with the Brazilian Institute of Space Research (INPE), Stanford University is using the Application Technology Satellite Series 3 (ATS-3) to exchange data, voice, image, and tele-documentation information with Brazil. The voice communication element is two-way and is to be used for seminars and lectures; the image communication element is one-way where the video signal, in slow-scan form received from Stanford, will be projected on special screen via telebeam projector; the tele-documentation communication element is two-way where documents will be transmitted and received using special equipment developed by Xerox Corp. This experiment began in January of 1972, and all transmission and receptions are confined to the two institutions; it is anticipated that information will be exchanged from three to six hours a week, with actual use of the system for education programs being initiated with the Stanford University 1972 spring semester.

Future Educational Satellite Experimentation
During 1973 and 1974 there will be a shift of the emphasis of educational satellite experimentation to television with the Application Technology Satellite Series F (ATS-F), a satellite configured to transmit powerful, highly directional television signals to relatively small and inexpensive ground receivers.

Three countries are planning major experimentation with the ATS-F, the United States, India, and Brazil; however, Brazil has not signed an agreement

for its use. Under a 1969 agreement between the Indian Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration of the United States (NASA), the ATS-F satellite is to be placed in orbit to cover a portion of the United States during the first year and then to be repositioned for Indian use.

NASA plans to launch the spacecraft in the summer of 1973 and to place it in a geostationary orbit where it will be in a position to provide experimental broadcast services to the Rocky Mountain States, the Appalachian Region, and Alaska. To date, the Rocky Mountain States have done the most extensive preparation for the experiment. However, little is known about the Appalachian or Alaskan portion of the experiment. It is estimated that from \$5.6 to \$8.8 million will be required to execute this Rocky Mountain portion of the experiment. The two fundamental objectives are: one, determine whether educational communication systems can be developed that will be technically feasible and also contribute to the solution of educational problems, two, determine the relative effectiveness of one-way and two-way communication systems relative to specific learner groups for specific instructional tasks.



More specifically, four alternative delivery patterns are to be tested to determine if different combinations are more effective with different learner groups: 1. One-way television alone; 2. two-way interactive with delayed feedback; 3. two-way interactive with immediate feedback and 4. TV plus two-way interactive with immediate feedback.

With television transmissions, the audio portion is to be varied according to the learner's language background; separate audio is to be provided for learners whose first language is English, Spanish, or American Indian. Two-way interactive transmissions are to involve digital information only and can be transmitted simultaneously with the TV broadcasts through separate voice channels. Delayed and immediate feedback is to be accomplished with a variation of computer-managed instruction and computer-assisted instruction, respectively.

Groups to be involved in the experiment have been identified within the eight-state region—Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, and Wyoming and include Indians, Chicanos, Blacks, and Anglos. The target areas represent the urban, suburban, rural, and isolated groups and include reservation-domiciled Indians and migrants with the objective of providing education services to ethnic and language groups who have not been served, or have been served inadequately, in the past by educational communications. Primary emphasis is to be placed upon the preschool age learner with early childhood development programs and upon the in-school age learner with career development programs. Secondary emphasis is to be placed on educating parents, educators (certified teachers), and paraprofessionals.

The Indian experiment has these three *primary* instructional objectives: contribute to family planning objectives, improve agricultural practices, and contribute to national integration.

The experiment will require approximately one year, starting in mid-1974, and is to involve the broadcasting of instructional television programs to an estimated 4,000-5,000 Indian villages. About 2,200 villages are to receive programs from the satellite through an inexpensive community receiver; the remaining villages will be provided programs received by earth stations and redistributed to community receivers via VHF conventional transmitters.



The community receivers are to be located in twelve clusters of about 400 villages each. These clusters are to be selected to obtain a wide range of data from the experiment. To gain experience in different cultural and linguistic settings, the clusters are to be spread over different parts of the country. The current plan for community reception is to spread seven clusters throughout the states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan, West Bengal, and Madras; the sets in the broadcast areas are to be located in five clusters in villages around the cities of Ahmedabad, Bombay, Poona, Delhi, and Srinagar, since the terrestrial TV transmitters are to be located

there. The cost estimates for the hardware component of the experiment is approximately \$6.7 million; however, no information is available on the software cost.

The proposed Brazilian ATS-F experiment is part of a larger effort on the part of the Brazilians to use modern technology to upgrade education and to educate the masses. Therefore, the objectives of the Brazilian experiment differ from those of India. While India is concentrating on an adult audience in remote areas, providing instruction in agriculture, health, and so on, the Brazilians are emphasizing the testing of satellite technology for central educational broadcasting, using a balance of radio and television to upgrade classroom instruction and teachers, and to improve learning as a function of different broadcast media.

The terrestrial experiment was to begin in June of 1972 and last for approximately four years. The first year or so is to be dedicated to work with a terrestrial information distribution system, with emphasis on a satellite system throughout most of 1973. Initially, the transmissions are being made to schools via VHF and medium wave methods using three radio and two TV stations. When properly equipped, some of the experimental schools are scheduled to receive programs relayed by the ATS-F satellite. However, prior to the use of the satellite, its use will be simulated through a terrestrial transmission of its signal. The actual satellite experiment will use a distribution and community information dissemination system.

Six hundred schools have been selected to participate in the experiment, and an attempt will be made to improve the first four years of education through in-service education and student programs.

The 600 schools being used in the experiment were selected at random according to three types of school: elementary school, elementary isolated, elementary united. Because the main objective is to test efficiency and effectiveness of new technologies relative to education, a comparison is to be made between schools using all of the technology, those using a portion of the technology, and those not using the technology at all. The experiment has been divided into missions according to years with specific emphasis on the types of individuals to which the program content will be geared, and the media and distribution mode to be used.

The major thrust of the first year is training supervisors, the upgrading of teachers, and showing both how to work with media to improve learning. Up to two hours of television and one or more hours of radio programs are provided per day, providing in-service education in the Portuguese language, social studies, health and natural sciences, math,

civics and moral education, and pedagogic and didactic notions. While in-service education continues, in the remaining three years a shift to student learning will occur.

The cost of the satellite portion of the experiment is estimated at about seven million dollars, approximately the same cost as the hardware for the Indian experiment. The software portion of the Brazilian experiment will cost about four and one-half million dollars, including the programmed instruction texts, whereas hardware and engineering costs will be slightly more than three million dollars. However, the cost of the four years of experimentation has been estimated to be twenty-four million dollars.

Some Institutional Satellite Research

Other types of research directly related to educational usage of broadcast satellites is currently under way at universities such as Stanford University in California, the University of Wisconsin in Madison, Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Cambridge, Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri, and The Pennsylvania State University in State College. Nonprofit institutions such as the Academy for Educational Development, the National Education Association, and Joint Council on Educational Telecommunications, all in Washington, are also involved in various satellite studies and research.

Three of Stanford's research programs are involved with: (1) the development of small, inexpensive receivers and earth stations for satellite broadcast reception, (2) a study which involves transmission of computer-assisted instruction programs via a broadcast satellite, and (3) the development of assessment techniques to ascertain the utility and practicability of international education, by information exchanges, via satellite with Brazil. Stanford also is collaborating with the University of Wisconsin by transmitting electrocardiographic data by satellite for medical diagnoses, in an attempt to develop the least expensive equipment necessary for such transmissions.

The Educational Satellite Center at Wisconsin was established for continuing research into the use of satellites for communication within and among nations. The emphasis at Wisconsin is upon simultaneously developing equipment and program content so that both reflect multidisciplinary inputs and are oriented toward the needs of the user. Other areas of their research are in the fields of information exchange and telecommunication law.

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) has developed the initial design for the proposed Indian domestic satellite system. MIT also is cooperating with India in the preparation for an instructional

satellite experiment to be conducted in 1974.

Washington University is conducting research to examine both the potential and the problems associated with the use of communication satellites for facilitating education in the United States. A major objective of their work is to make available to decision-makers alternative educational satellite approaches along with their educational, social, legal, economic, and political implications.

The Pennsylvania State University is in the process of developing mobile vans that will be used for Computer Assisted and managed instruction during the United States satellite experiment. This Computer Assisted Instruction laboratory, working with migrant and other labor, will provide career education programs emphasizing high school diploma equivalency programs for adults.

The Academy for Educational Development has conducted a three-part study of broadcast satellites and related educational technology. The first part treats the current status of satellites and other audio-visual systems, the law, and the decision points necessary for the effective use of satellites. The second part discusses projections in technology, international meetings, and international law through 1976, with emphasis upon identifying key policy decision points with which the United States and other nations will be confronted in the next half-decade. The third part attempts to provide countries planning significant communication system planning for educational and social development purposes with a model delineating alternative steps which would optimize the effectiveness, feasibility, and economy of such systems when deployed. Case studies of Brazil, India, and the United States also are provided.

The National Education Association (NEA) has been deeply involved in exploring the use of broadcast satellites for education. Of particular interest has been the benefits to the State of Alaska. Recently, the NEA has released a monograph for educators, which provides basic information about satellite technology and its education potential.

The Joint Council on Educational Telecommunications (JCET) has been active in stimulating the educational communities' interest in the potentials of satellites and in attempting to gain education channels on future United States domestic satellites. The JCET was also instrumental in drawing the educational communities' attention to the potential of 2.5 Gigahertz band for educational satellite communication.

The results of the above experiments and research must be widely distributed in order for the total educational community to assist, plan, and harvest

potential benefits. Such information will be essential for both the planning and execution of future educational satellite experiments and planning the potential use of satellite technology for revitalizing the educational systems of the United States.

Possible Benefits of Satellites to the United States

Current educational telecommunication systems can be categorized according to three main services: (1) information dissemination, including radio, TV, facsimile, and cable; (2) interactive telecommunications, such as talk-back television, teleconferencing, on-line information retrieval, and computer-based instruction; and (3) computer interconnection, such as remote batch processing and resource-sharing. Combining the distribution capability of a satellite with the telecommunication systems services may provide the capability for a viable multi-media, multi-purpose educational system that is nationwide in scope. It is possible that such a system could meet some of the needs of primary and secondary schools, vocational and continuing education programs, rural and adult education programs, and specialized training programs at reduced costs with increased effectiveness.

Among other benefits that might accrue to the educational community are:

- Widespread information access and distribution for the sparsely-populated, rural areas of the contiguous United States, Alaska, and Hawaii, consequently, providing for greater equality of educational opportunity.
- The catalytic effect of the satellite for comprehensive educational reform, perhaps through an evolutionary cycle beginning with an add-on system, specialized centers, and differentiated staffs on to truly "open school systems".
- An increasingly cost-effective, efficient system with quicker, better results than current systems.
- Access to effective, validated software developed through systematic design and revision.
- Services that include school management data-processing, on-line information retrieval, computer-based instruction, and intercommunity conferences.

If satellite technology has educational merit, a problem second only to software development facing the evaluation of a large scale educational instructional satellite system is the method and means for consolidating and integrating the varied interests in instructional programming and telecommunications into a national network capable of providing these services without sacrificing local control and autonomy. Educational, political, social, administrative, and economic factors must be considered in the design of such a system.

THE GOLD STANDARD:

PANACEA FOR INFLATION?



By Warren L. Fisher '67



Max E. Ameigh '57

The WINTER 1972 issue of the *Lycoming Magazine* included an article by the American Institute for Economic Research in which the view was presented that the “forgotten man” (defined as the “. . . quiet, virtuous, domestic citizen, who pays his debts and taxes . . .”) has borne the burden of the United States’ inflation. Inflation was aptly described as a harsh and arbitrary form of taxation of savers, of those who must live on fixed incomes, and of those whose incomes increase at a rate less than the rate of inflation. The Institute then moved rather suddenly to the conclusion that the “forgotten man” can end this “embezzlement” only by exercising his voting power to elect politicians—as differentiated from statesmen—who will effect the restoration of “. . . the gold standard for the nation’s currency at the earliest practicable date . . .”

The purposes of the present article are:

- (1) to illustrate that the Institute has presented a view which is not in the mainstream of current economic thought,
- (2) to demonstrate that a return to the gold standard could not solve the problem of economic instability, but that the actual transition to the gold standard could easily initiate a period of severe instability,
- (3) to indicate that politicians (as differentiated from statesmen—we concur on this point) have been remarkably receptive to the views of voters on the issue of economic stability.

The illustration that the Institute’s view is not typical of modern economic thought will be by comparison: I will try to present the more common view. In order to demonstrate the relative merits of the gold standard, the economic stability of the gold standard will be contrasted with the economic stability of the period since 1933. The upshot of a brief review of U.S. monetary history will be the fact that both inflation and unemployment measure economic stability. The gold standard era experienced moderate inflation and high levels of unemployment,

while the years since the Depression have been characterized by moderate unemployment and relatively high rates of inflation. The recent inflation has not resulted from our monetary standard, but rather from three wars and political activities directed toward full employment.

Sufficient evidence will also emerge to support the notion that politicians have been receptive to the voting power of the “forgotten man”. They have balanced budgets when voters wanted balanced budgets and ignored inflation when voters wanted jobs. In fact, there is a sense in which politicians of the past century have been so sensitive to the votes of the “forgotten man” that they have caused economic instability by overreaction. For this they can be properly criticized.

THE YEARS OF THE METALLIC STANDARDS

It is common knowledge that mankind has had a fetish for metal money since we learned to melt and use metals for making payments. Most modern states developed metallic standards during the Renaissance when the flow of gold and silver from the New World provided the necessary stock to support these standards. These metallic standards had in common the fact that the value of the metal money depended upon the weight of precious metal contained in the coin. As long as the current production of these metals was trivial compared to the accumulated stock of them, and as long as speculation did not cause massive gold or silver flows between nations, the metals maintained about the same relative scarcity and value. Under favorable circumstances price changes were not a problem.

The infant United States used two precious metals, gold and silver, as money from 1791 to 1861. This bimetallic standard was adopted for the pragmatic reason that we had emerged from the Revolution with very little of either gold or silver. The system represented a significant improvement over the

inflated Continental currency which had been over-issued, but bimetallism had some faults of its own. The initial price given to silver was too low relative to gold, resulting in sizable gold outflows to Europe. Congress overreacted in 1834 to the public's distress over gold's disappearance from the country by raising the price of gold. The devaluation of 6.6% gave gold a price too low relative to silver and the gold returned from Europe in exchange for U.S. silver. We moved rapidly to the *de facto* gold standard which we maintained until late 1861.

It was during this era of legal bimetallism that we began to experience periods of boom and bust. We had a mild recession from 1818 to 1822 and a severe depression from the late 1830's to 1845. We also had a recession which reached its bottom in 1857.

It became obvious shortly after the outbreak of the Civil War that the Government could not meet its expenses with its small reserve of gold. Taxation did not seem to be a viable means for financing the war, and the potential of borrowing by selling "certificates of guaranteed confiscation" was not realized. The "greenback" dollar, which has been frequently used to exemplify an inherent weakness of paper money, was printed, printed, and printed.

The convertibility of paper money into gold was suspended in early 1862 to free all existing gold to make payments to foreign nations. The consequence of our second experience with an inconvertible paper standard was similar to the first (the Continental currency): The price level doubled in the four years from 1861 to 1865, largely as a result of the overissue of paper money. The voter who held a greenback for these four years found that it was worth only thirty-nine cents when he traded it against a gold dollar in 1865. He was understandably upset with monetary mismanagement. His desire to return to gold at the pre-war gold price was reflected in Congressional approval, in 1873, of a bill authorizing the initiation of the gold standard as soon as prices fell to their pre-war level.

The cost of returning to gold was high. Prices began to fall shortly after the Civil War and price declines accelerated during the recession of 1873-79. This combination of recession and falling prices was particularly disastrous for the 52.5% of our population who were farmers, since falling prices for farm crops meant falling farm incomes. Prices reached their pre-war level in 1879, and the Government resumed convertibility of paper money into gold at that time. The fifty-four-year era of the gold standard in the United States had begun.

The economy emerged from the post-war recession to show its strength in the following two decades. Led by the expansion and use of its railroads, the influx of hard-working immigrants, the expansion

of the frontier, and unprecedented productivity increases, real annual per capita income increased from \$327 in the period 1877-1881 to \$496 in the period 1897-1901. The path of this progress is traced in Column 5 of Table 1.

TABLE I
Index of Gross National Product, Total and Per Capita
In Current and 1929 Prices, and Price Levels
1869 to 1933

(Five-year periods are annual averages)

Year or Period (1)	GNP in 1929 Prices*		GNP in Current Prices*		Implicit Price Index (1929=100) (6)
	Total (2)	Per Capita (3)	Total (4)	Per Capita (5)	
1869-1873	6.7	165	9.1	223	74
1872-1876	7.5	171	11.2	254	67
1877-1881	9.2	186	16.1	327	57
1882-1886	11.3	204	20.7	374	55
1887-1891	12.3	199	24.0	388	51
1889-1893	13.5	210	27.3	424	49
1892-1896	13.6	199	29.6	434	46
1897-1901	17.3	231	37.1	496	47
1902-1906	24.2	294	46.8	569	52
1907-1911	31.6	349	55.0	608	57
1912-1916	40.3	408	62.5	632	64
1917-1921	75.6	719	71.9	683	105
1919	78.9	755	74.2	710	106
1920	88.9	835	73.3	688	121
1921	74.0	682	71.6	660	103
1922	74.0	672	75.8	689	98
1923	86.1	769	85.8	766	100
1924	87.6	768	88.4	775	99
1925	91.3	788	90.5	781	101
1926	97.7	832	96.4	821	101
1927	96.3	809	97.3	817	99
1928	98.2	815	98.5	817	100
1929	104.4	857	104.4	857	100
1930	91.1	740	95.1	772	96
1931	76.3	615	89.5	721	85
1932	58.5	468	76.4	611	77
1933	56.0	446	74.2	590	75

Total GNP in billions of dollars, per capita GNP in dollars.

Source: *The Statistical History of the United States from Colonial Times to the Present*, 1965, page 139.

If Table 1 could have been constructed on an annual basis, it would have also revealed that these decades of rapid economic growth were times of recession followed by prosperity. (Of course, it would be equally correct to follow the institute's characterization of these periods as ones of prosperity followed by depression: The chicken-and-egg nature of the question is clear). Setbacks occurred in the recessions of 1884-85 and 1893-97.* The former was mild, as the recession of 1857 had been, and boom conditions were in evidence before 1887. The 1893-97 crisis was not mild. It resembled the crises of 1837 and 1873 in terms of its severity. Table 1 gives us some idea of the income lost during this gold standard depression; real per capita income increased an average of only \$10 per year over the period 1892-1896, as compared with \$36 in the previous period and \$62 in the following period. It is reasonable to assume that most of the \$10 increase above occurred in 1892.

*The recurrence of these periods of bust were so regular that the sequence of economic expansion followed by a contraction was dubbed the "business cycle".

Table II reveals the increasing instability of our economy during the years 1900 to 1914. Instead of waiting its normal ten years between recessions, the economy took a premature dip in 1903-04. In this mild recession income did not drop and unemployment increased only slightly. By contrast, the years 1907 and 1908 were ones of economic hardship. Unemployment jumped from 1.8% to 8.5% in less than a year. GNP fell more than one billion dollars. Fortunately prosperity returned by 1909.

TABLE II
Unemployment As a Percentage of the
Civilian Labor Force:
1900-1933

Year	Rate of Unemployment (percent)	Year	Rate of Unemployment (percent)
1900	5.0	1917	4.8
1901	2.4	1918	1.4
1902	2.7	1919	2.3
1903	2.6	1920	4.0
1904	4.8	1921	11.9
1905	3.1	1922	7.6
1906	0.8	1923	3.2
1907	1.8	1924	5.5
1908	8.5	1925	4.0
1909	5.2	1926	1.9
1910	5.9	1927	4.1
1911	6.2	1928	4.4
1912	5.2	1929	3.2
1913	4.4	1930	8.7
1914	8.0	1931	15.9
1915	9.7	1932	23.6
1916	4.8	1933	24.9

Source: *The Statistical History of the United States from Colonial times to the Present*, 1965, page 73.

The prosperity was equally short-lived, yielding to unsatisfactory employment and income performance in 1910-11; 1912 and 1913 were years of boom which were interrupted when consumers and investors became bearish due to the uncertainty generated by the hostilities in Europe. The result of their caution was the recession of 1914-15.

When we became actively involved in the war in 1917 the government was once again confronted with the task of paying war-time expenses. The newly-created Federal Reserve System was assigned the task of aiding the Treasury in this effort; i.e., the Federal Reserve became subservient to the Treasury. For all practical purposes, this misuse of the Federal Reserve was retained until 1951. The unfortunate result of this mismatch cannot be overstated, since we will see later how it facilitated inflation until the mid-fifties.

From an analytical point of view the use of the Federal Reserve to finance a portion of the Government's war-time expenditures during WW I gave rise to a situation which differed only in degree from the periods of the Continental currency and the greenback: The Government paid over 5% of its bills with newly-created money. This new money aided the massive inflows of gold from Europe in driving the price level up more than 80% during the war years.

Another interesting feature of this period was our temporary deviation from the gold standard. While

we retained domestic convertibility of the dollar into gold, we joined the Europeans in restricting the free flow of gold among nations. For us the consequences of this brief deviation were minor, but the return to gold by the Europeans provides an excellent illustration of the shock which an economy can suffer in a transition to gold. Britain and Italy returned to gold in 1925 and 1927, respectively. Both economies immediately experienced depressed export industries because neither nation had devalued. Unemployment spread from export industries to gain a firm grip on both economies. France, on the other hand, not only devalued but its devaluation was more than necessary. Result? Following France's return to gold in 1928 French industries boomed, and the good fortune of these industries fed a nationwide prosperity and inflation. The U.S., meanwhile, was enjoying its most notorious period of prosperity—the roaring twenties. This boom is so well remembered that one often forgets that the twenties did not “roar” from the outset. An inflation in 1919 was followed by a sharp recession in 1920-22. Industrial production fell by nearly 33% and unemployment jumped from 2.3% in 1919 to 11.9% by 1921. Recovery from this recession was slow, with another mini-recession in 1924. By 1926 the economy was on one of its most remarkable upswings—the one which ended in the Great Crash. The Depression worsened while President Hoover tried to carry out the popular mandate for balanced budgets. This further aggravated the Depression and the unemployed voter. Without additional detail, we can note that the gold standard, which remains nostalgic in the minds of some today, ended by FDR's order in 1933.

1933 TO THE PRESENT

We ceased to use gold as money within the domestic economy with the recall of the gold coins and gold certificates. There was no longer any real tie between the amount of gold in Fort Knox (and the Federal Reserve) and the paper money, although the statutes gave the gold stock and the inconvertible paper money a nominal tie.* Gold's sole remaining monetary function was at the international level. Foreign central banks could request and receive gold at the fixed price of \$35 an ounce (the dollar had been devalued in 1934), and the Treasury also stood ready to buy gold at that price. This system prevailed until the U.S. balance of payments problems of the last decade forced the recent changes—the removal of gold as domestic currency's “backing” and the refusal to buy or sell gold upon request by foreign central banks.

*Prior to 1968 the amount of Federal Reserve notes issued was legally limited by the size of the gold stock. The limit was never reached, so the requirement never constituted a tie between paper money and gold. In 1968, this requirement was eliminated to free the bold “backing” for making international payments.

It is interesting that this system was perhaps even more illogical than the gold standard itself. From 1935 to 1971 gold was mined and melted into ingots, only to be transported to Fort Knox and buried in the ground. This mining, melting, and transport was paid for by taxpayers; yet the gold was used only to make international payments. How much cheaper it would have been to follow the suggestion of the Europeans and use some mutually agreeable paper money instead.

Art Buchwald highlighted the lack of logic in the system when he proposed the initiation of a "junk car standard". Under this standard junk autos would have been pressed into blocks (as in the movie *Goldfinger*) and substituted for the gold ingots in Fort Knox. This would not only have saved us the expense of mining gold, but it would also have helped President Johnson's program to beautify America, and made us far richer than the Soviets who had relatively few junk cars.

The above is clearly an overstatement for emphasis. It would be unreasonable to expect that the cultural tie between money and gold (described earlier as a 'fetish'), however illogical, could be broken quickly. FDR took the first step by removing the domestic monetary role of gold, and we may be moving toward complete demonetization of gold today. If that move is made, gold will resume the same status that it had before we learned how to use it for money: It will be a metal which is similar to lead.

What were the consequences of the removal of gold from our domestic transactions? Table III indicates the economy's performance since 1933. Recovery from the Depression was aided by deficit spending, but we suffered a setback in 1938 when the Federal Reserve tightened the reins on our paper money in order to prevent it from causing inflation. This is another case of overreaction. The fear of inflation such as we had after the Revolution, the Civil War, and World War I guided the decision to put on the monetary brakes. The resultant high levels of high unemployment remained until 1942 or 1943, when our economy began its build-up for World War II.

Prices remained fairly stable during World War II because the inflationary tendencies were suppressed. Wage controls, and price controls, and a general unavailability of items for consumers to purchase forced the money, which normally would have caused price increases into savings. With the end of the war and its controls, the economy boomed and inflated as these stored-up dollars flooded into the market. The Federal Reserve was unable to prevent this because it was bound to a program of supporting low, interest rates for the Treasury. (This inability to fight inflation led the Federal Reserve to assert its independence from the Treasury in 1951.)

TABLE III
Index of Price Levels, Unemployment As a Percentage of the Civilian Labor Force, and Gross National Product in Current and 1958 Prices, 1934 to 1971

Year (1)	Implicit Price Index (1958=100) (2)	Rate of Unemployment (percent) (3)	GNP in Actual Prices* (4)	GNP in 1958 Prices* (5)
1934	42.2	21.7	65.1	154.3
1935	42.6	20.1	72.2	169.5
1936	42.7	16.9	82.5	193.0
1937	44.5	14.3	90.4	203.2
1938	43.9	19.0	84.7	192.9
1939	43.2	17.2	90.5	209.4
1940	43.9	14.6	99.7	227.2
1941	47.2	9.9	124.5	263.7
1942	53.0	4.7	157.9	297.8
1943	56.8	1.9	191.6	337.1
1944	58.2	1.2	210.1	361.3
1945	59.7	1.9	211.9	355.2
1946	66.7	3.9	208.5	312.6
1947	74.6	3.9	231.3	309.9
1948	79.6	3.8	257.6	323.7
1949	79.1	5.9	256.5	324.1
1950	80.2	5.3	284.8	355.3
1951	85.6	3.3	328.4	383.4
1952	87.5	3.0	345.5	395.1
1953	88.3	2.9	364.6	412.8
1954	89.6	5.5	364.8	407.0
1955	90.9	4.4	398.0	438.0
1956	94.0	4.1	419.2	446.1
1957	97.5	4.3	441.1	452.5
1958	100.0	6.8	447.3	447.3
1959	101.6	5.5	483.7	475.9
1960	103.3	5.5	503.7	487.7
1961	104.6	6.7	520.1	497.2
1962	105.8	5.5	560.3	529.8
1963	107.2	5.7	590.5	551.0
1964	108.8	5.2	632.4	581.1
1965	110.9	4.5	684.9	617.8
1966	113.9	3.8	749.9	658.1
1967	117.6	3.8	793.9	675.2
1968	122.3	3.6	864.2	706.6
1969	128.2	3.5	929.1	724.7
1970	135.3	4.9	974.1	720.0
1971P	141.6	5.9	1,046.8	739.5

* GNP in billions of dollars

P = Preliminary

Source: *The Economic Report of the President*, January 1972
pages 195, 196, 198, 223

We had periods of increasing unemployment and reduced inflation in 1949, 1953-54, and 1958-59. The latter recession was severe; recovery from it was slow. President Eisenhower had balanced the budget for the voters who demanded "fiscal responsibility". This certainly slowed the recovery; some claim that the recovery never really occurred until after the Kennedy tax-cut which was designed to pull the economy out of the 1961 recession.

The remainder of the period is familiar to most of us. The Democrats, who gained office partly as a result of the unsatisfactory employment performance of the Eisenhower years, sought to obtain low levels of unemployment. War spending facilitated this goal and catalyzed the accelerating inflation after 1965. The Nixon Administration induced a recession to end inflation, although there is reason to believe that it is presently reacting to complaints of inordinate unemployment—even though the recession has not been severe and/or long enough to break the back of price increases.

THE PERIODS COMPARED

Our rather lengthy digression enables a comparison of the stability of the gold-standard years with the

years since 1933, but what measure should be used for "stability"? The Institute suggests *prices*; our survey suggests an additional measure: *employment*. Further, we have seen that the two measures are related in that periods of high unemployment generally correspond to periods of relative price stability, and vice versa. A fundamental explanation of this correlation is as follows: Unemployed workers will not pay high prices and cannot seek higher wages; producers lay-off employees and/or maintain stable or falling prices in a recession to cut costs or prevent revenue losses.

Let us use each measure. The gold-standard years display unusual *price* stability as compared with the later years. If we abstract from the aftermath of the Civil War and the inflation of World War I, we can see from Table I that prices in the period 1877-1881 were the same as prices in the period 1907-11. The most inflation we can attribute to this period is the 24% increase from 1892-1896 to 1907-1911. This is roughly one fourth of the rate of inflation in modern years. By the yardstick of prices the gold standard era was more stable than the recent era of the inconvertible paper standard.

The gold standard fares poorly when the measure of stability is *unemployment*. Unemployment figures date back only to 1900, but even the available data are revealing. We can see from Tables II and III that unemployment exceeded 6% in eleven of the thirty-four years of the gold standard and in ten of the years since 1933. The comparison becomes even clearer if we do not consider the years of the gold standard legacy, 1934-1941. In this case only two of thirty years show unemployment over 6%. Further, the extreme ranges of unemployment that plagued the gold standard years do not occur today; it is only from specific regions within our nation where defense industries are cut back, or where other unusual factors are at work, that unemployment rates of 8, 9, or 10% are sometimes reported.

"PROSPERITY OR?"

It is widely recognized that an uncontrolled economy can only achieve high employment at the expense of price stability, and vice versa. A return to the gold standard would provide us with a much more stable price level, although there is neither logical reasons nor empirical evidence which demonstrates that the gold standard is a panacea for inflation. Our experience during the years immediately preceding World War I illustrates the potential inflationary impact of the gold standard. Milton Friedman, the bulwark of modern economic conservatism, has said there can be no doubt that these gold inflows from trade and speculation were a major contributor to the inflation before and during World War I.

What a return to the gold standard could do is cause periodic widespread unemployment by prohibiting the Federal Reserve from counteracting unfavorable business conditions by introducing more money into the economy or withdrawing some from it. Today the Federal Reserve has the potential to enable moderation in both inflation and unemployment by adjusting the stock of money in the economy. When this power is teamed with proper Federal budget policy (surpluses in inflationary periods, deficits in recessions), we probably have the ability to keep inflation under 3.5% *and* unemployment under 5%.

Whether these tools are used properly or not is a different matter. We have already seen that balanced budgets have been a demand by voters. We have also noted the ill-effects of Hoover and Eisenhower acquiescing to these popular desires for balanced budgets. In both cases the voting power of the unemployed emerged in the next election. In the Kennedy-Johnson case the reaction to unemployment was so strong that inflation was permitted. Nixon, too, has a dilemma: Many are predicting decreased unemployment and increased inflation before the next election.

A final note should be made concerning the actual transition to a gold standard. Experience strongly suggests that only rare luck can prevent a return to gold from creating severe instability. It will be recalled that the transition after the Civil War necessitated a period of recession and falling prices, since we did not want to devalue. The cases of Italy and Britain after World War I also serve to illustrate the possibility of depression following a move to the gold standard with the price of gold kept too low. France's post-World War I experience illustrates the inflationary bias which obtains from giving gold a price which is too high. In short, there can be no assurance that gold will be given a "proper" price, since we lack a magic formula for it; and, recession or inflation follow from a return to gold when gold is given the "wrong" price.

In summary, we can certainly say that politicians have been responsive to voters. Unfortunately, they have tried to effect two mutually inconsistent goals—price stability and high levels of employment. Too often their zealotry for votes has made them very intense upon one goal, and then too intense on the other. In view of the trade-off between prices and employment, the return to the gold standard would reduce (but not prevent) inflation at the expense of increased unemployment. The moral is now clear: The "forgotten man" is not being fleeced without receiving just compensation. Perhaps we should alter the Institute's figure to, "Be Shorn, Little Lamb, or Stand Idle".

SEVERIN ROESEN, THE WILLIAMSPORT PAINTER



Dr. Mook

By: Dr. Maurice A. Mook, *Professor of Anthropology*

Severin Roesen, the mysterious "Williamsport Painter", is no longer as mysterious as he once was. Descendants of the painter have been heard from recently, and it is now possible to separate truth from legends relating to his life and work, both in Europe and in this country. There are, today, six living great-grandchildren of the artist, one of whom is an enthusiastic family historian who has assiduously researched records pertaining to the family, especially as they relate to the painter's activities in this country.

It has long been assumed, but we now know for sure, that the painter was born in Germany, probably in or near Cologne. His birthdate is unknown, but it was probably between 1815 and 1820. After his arrival in this country, he married Wilhelmina Ludwig, who was born in Altsei, a small Rhineland village near Cologne. She was born on Christmas day, 1832, and was brought to this country by her family when she was sixteen years old. Severin married her in New York City, soon after he arrived in 1848. Their daughter Louisa was born February 1, 1851, when her mother was still in her nineteenth year. Their son Oscar was born August 13, 1857, which is about the time Roesen left New York City to spend the rest of his life in Pennsylvania. There was another daughter born to the union, but her name and birthdate are as yet unknown.

All three of the children were born, married, and died in New York City. Their mother remained in New York and died in the Bronx October 15, 1903 in her seventy-first year. The tradition that, because the painter could not support his family, his wife and children left him in New York and returned to Germany is a legendary error. It is apparent that Roesen was not very successful in selling his paintings in New York City. It is also known that he left his young wife with her three small children in New York and moved to Pennsylvania, probably in 1858. His motives for leaving the metropolis and his family are unknown, but perhaps he hoped that he might be more successful among his countrymen in Pennsylvania.

Roesen's residence in New York City has been firmly established as extending from 1848 to 1857. He is listed in New York City directories for these years, but his name is missing in the directories for 1858 and 1859. "Mina" Roesan is recorded in the 1860 directory as a "widow", engaged in sewing for a living. Family tradition has it that she also worked as a practical nurse to support herself and children. Evidently she never heard from Roesen after he left New York. That she declared herself a widow in 1860 must mean either that she had not heard from her husband and believed him to be dead, or that she was too proud to admit that she and her children had been abandoned by the artist.

Although financially unsuccessful in New York, Roesen was active as a painter during these years. Fourteen signed and dated Roesen still-life paintings have been discovered to date, nine of which were painted during his residence in New York. One each is dated 1848, 1849, 1850, and 1852; two are dated 1851, and three are dated 1857. Five of these are privately owned, three are in public collections, and one is for sale in a New York gallery at the time of present writing. The earliest dated Roesen, a flower piece, is at the Corcoran Gallery in Washington (Fig. 1), and two early dated fruit pieces, one of which is here illustrated, are in the White House Collection (Fig. 2). The fruit composition at the Kennedy Gallery (Fig. 3) is unique in that it is clearly signed Roesen, retaining the German umlaut spelling of his name.

During his New York residence Roesen sold eleven paintings (six florals, three fruit, two fruit and flowers) to the short-lived American Art-Union. From 1848 to 1850 the Union distributed ten of these to owners living in seven states, ranging from Maine to Georgia and from Michigan to Louisiana. His paintings thus early received a more widespread distribution than they were again to attain until many years later. His eleventh canvas, a flower composition, was sold at the public auction which liquidated the Union in December 1852. The Union

had paid Roesen \$66.00 for it, and it was sold to a bidder for \$45.00. This figure is mentioned as in stark contrast to the fact that Roesens have been sold during the past year for c. \$10,000 each.

The dimensions of Art-Union paintings were usually indicated in the numerous catalogues the Union distributed to its patrons. The size of nine Art-Union Roesens is known, and they vary from 21"x26" to 26" x 40". For a former porcelain and enamel miniaturist he was painting from medium to large canvases in New York, although none of these is as large as some of his later Williamsport paintings.

Roesen left New York in 1858, and local tradition has it that he arrived in Williamsport "about 1858". This traditional date now seems to be too early, for both alternative tradition and the distribution of some of his paintings suggest that he painted, perhaps for several years, in Philadelphia and Harrisburg before he arrived in Williamsport. In view of the mobility of paintings, distributional evidence is uncertain, and I reluctantly mention it as evidence of provenience. However, at least one Philadelphia dealer claimed to have found Roesen paintings, allegedly of local origin, in Philadelphia and "Main Line" homes.

In 1955 I interviewed two Philadelphia families that owned paintings by Roesen. In one home their Roesen was signed and dated 1852, and therefore was painted in New York City; in the other their small Roesen fruit painting had been brought to Philadelphia by family migration from Williamsport. From still another informant I heard an emphatically told story that Roesen had lived and painted in a small hotel in downtown Philadelphia and that at one time there were "many" of his paintings at this property. The hotel, however, had been razed years earlier, and I could learn nothing as to its former occupants or the disposition of its contents. The fact remains, however, that a number of Roesen paintings have appeared in recent years at Philadelphia galleries, and several have been ascribed to local origin.

Tradition is equally strong that Roesen lived and painted in Harrisburg in the late 1850's. His name, however, is unrecorded in Harrisburg city directories for these years. In early 1956 I visited two Harrisburg families that were the proud possessors of Roesen paintings. In one case their two small Roesens had been brought from Williamsport. In the other family, however, I was told that their two large Roesens, which were a "matched pair" (one fruit and one flowers, of the same dimensions, and in identical, original, heavy frames) had been bought from the artist by the grandfather of one of the members of the present family. I was also taken to a downtown site on Market Square (in Williamsport Roesen also lived in Market Square) where, according

to this family's tradition, Roesen had his studio in an upper story of a business building owned by the grandfather of one of the present owners of the paintings. These paintings have been in this family's possession since they were directly acquired from the artist in 1859.

In December 1955 the late Mr. Morris H. Housel of Williamsport purchased from a dealer a few miles south of Harrisburg a large Roesen flower painting which is signed and dated 1862. The dealer claimed that the painting was of local derivation. Mr. Housel wrote me at the time that he was satisfied that the painting had been painted in Harrisburg and that, accordingly, only paintings of later date should be thought of as painted in Williamsport. Even if we accept the 1862 Roesen as a Williamsport production, the period of Roesen's Williamsport residence will have to be redefined. At any rate the local tradition that Roesen arrived in Williamsport "about 1858" is now subject to revision.

Another Williamsport traditional idea that needs revision is the one that concerns "matched pair" Roesen paintings, such as the pair in Harrisburg that I have mentioned. It is evident that the painter sometimes received commissions for a pair of paintings, rather than for a single one. Williamsport tradition is inconsistent with respect to paired paintings by Roesen: one version has it that when he painted two paintings for the same patron, he "always" signed but one of them; another says that he "usually" signed but one; and the other says that he "sometimes" signed but one. The pair of Roesens here reproduced (Figs. 4 and 5) is a matched pair, and both of them are signed. Richard Stone also illustrated a matched pair (*Not Quite Forgotten*, pp. 20 and 21, nos. 35 and 36 in his catalogue, p. 34), both of which are also signed; and Gerdtz and Burke also illustrate a matched pair (Figs. 5-12 and 5-13, pp. 75 and 76), both of which are both signed and dated. Illustrations such as these belie at least the first version of the Williamsport tradition above mentioned.

Only five of the fourteen now-known dated Roesen paintings can be ascribed to his Williamsport period. The dates are 1862, '63, '65, '70, and '72, and they are all signed by the artist. (All dated Roesens are signed, but over 100 signed Roesens are not dated). The last dated one (Fig. 6) is of special interest, for unless the signature-with-date is a forgery, which has never been averred, it disproves the local Williamsport tradition that Roesen left Williamsport and died in a Philadelphia almshouse in 1871. He obviously did not do so, at least in 1871. Again we see that tradition can not be accepted as history, unless and until such tradition is authenticated by non-traditional evidence.

Such evidence is hard to obtain for Roesen's Williamsport period. He is listed in a Williamsport city directory of 1866-67 which apparently was the first one published. He is also in Williamsport directories for 1869-70 and 1871-72. In these three directories his surname is spelled in three different ways and he is indicated as having lived at three different addresses. He is known to have lived in five different places during the ten years or so of his residence in Williamsport. If we include both sides of a street, all five of his locations were within a single city block northwest of Market Square. The best described of these places is a studio, where he also resided, on the third floor of the former Ulman Building at 1-3 West Third Street. This building, on the southwest corner of Market Square, was razed in April, 1972.

The best account we have of Roesen, his studio, and his personal habits is an unsigned article, written by an obviously competent reporter, published in the June 25, 1895 issue of the *Williamsport Sun and Banner*. Although written nearly a quarter of a century after the artist's residence in Williamsport, this article is the nearest-to-contemporary account we have of this mid-nineteenth century man. The author states that:

“(Roesen) came here about 1858 and occupied a large, long room in the third story of the building at the southwest corner of Market and Third Streets. The room is described as a typical Bohemian den in the middle of which stood a large stove, set in a square box with ashes, which formed a large cuspidor. His bed was an old lounge, and pegs on the wall formed his wardrobe. There were about a hundred pictures, mostly half finished and covered with dust, standing about the room, and half a dozen easels holding canvases and a few modern chairs completed his furnishings. He took his meals, rather irregularly, at the old United States Hotel, of which the late Valentine S. Doebler was proprietor. Some of his paintings with which he was wont to pay his board at times, still remain in the Doebler family.”

The United States Hotel in the 1860's was located at 17-19 West Third Street, west of Market Square. It was only a few steps from the artist's studio at 3 West Third Street. Valentine Doebler was one of Roesen's best friends in Williamsport. The painting herewith reproduced (Fig. 7) is one of the paintings alluded to in the quotation. It is one of Roesen's finest small floral compositions, and is dated 1865. Doebler family tradition had it that Valentine Doebler especially commissioned it as a gift for his wife on her birthday.

In a somewhat more personal way the author of this interesting and informing article tells us that: “His studio was much frequented by his friends, who would sit all day with this genial, well-read and generous companion, smoking his pipes and drinking his beer, and he was seldom without this beverage . . . His quarters were a rendezvous for many of our well-known citizens, who would listen for hours and watch him paint . . . His name is kept green by those who knew him and all speak of him with words of affection. After these are gone, his words addressed to a young lady, ‘Miss, my pictures will live long after me,’ will be literally fulfilled.”

As, indeed, they have lived now for a full century, inasmuch as the artist apparently died in 1872.

The author of the newspaper article also described Roesen's manner of painting:

“His paintings were chiefly flower and fruit subjects, and he excelled in the former. His truly wonderful grouping of flowers, their coloring and the admirable technique of the artist excite the admiration. Many of his canvases are large and all in this city are (were then) in an excellent state of preservation. He was wont to walk about the city streets and country lanes gazing at gardens of flowers of every description, and on his return he would quickly transfer them to canvas, not even making a sketch of them. He would in this manner build up a most effective combination of different flowers of different colors.”

The writer then adds what is probably an apocryphal bit of folk imagination when he says that “in one corner of the finished painting would always appear the faint outline of a beer glass, and when a customer objected to its presence he would say, ‘Why, do you not like beer?’ and then take it out!”

The foregoing paragraphs by our unknown essayist deserve two comments. The allusion to the painter returning to his studio and “quickly transfer (ing the flowers he had seen outdoors) to canvas, not even making a sketch of them” should not be taken literally. He was an indoor painter, to be sure, and preliminary sketches for his finished paintings have never been found. He probably never made any, for he was too adamantly committed to European conventions of still-life painting to need preparatory sketches. He painted with botanical verisimilitude, but he never painted the particular combination of plants, fruits, or flowers that he had ever observed in nature. His floral compositions are fanciful combinations of flowers that bloom at different seasons of the year. The same is true of his fruit pieces, in which the painter assembled combinations of native and foreign fruits that would have been impossible to obtain in his time with its lack of

rapid transportation and refrigeration facilities we take for granted today. Roesen painted imaginatively only in the respect that his combinations of fruits, flowers, or both were fanciful. The particular fruit, flower, or plant is never painted imaginatively. His careful observation of structural characteristics of fruits and flowers extended to their most minute parts. He rendered each part of stems, leaves, flowers, and fruit with great accuracy and skill. He was also a supremely competent colorist. But, except in the respect indicated, he painted without imagination, emotion, or vision. He was not an interpretive painter.

Comment may be made concerning his beer-drinking habits alluded to in the newspaper quotation. There can be no doubt that he was fond of this beverage. It is impossible to deny that he was a tippler. The comments of his contemporaries—transmitted through oral tradition, which tends toward exaggeration—are practically unanimous in this respect. We are told that he peddled his paintings to pay for his board, rent, and bar bills. (On this account no doubt, he is listed as a “pedler”, rather than as an artist, in the 1869-70 Williamsport city directory). However, there is no evidence to support the allegation that he became socially impossible and that his painting deteriorated due to his alcoholism. Unfortunately, this charge was made by the first art historian to recognize Roesen as worth mentioning in the history of American art (Born, p. 25).

It may be admitted that Roesen occasionally shows evidence of being a “part-time perfectionist” (the phrase is Richard Stone’s, p. 26), in the sense that sometimes a portion of a canvas may not be as well done as the rest of it. But if his dated paintings are arranged in their chronological order it is impossible to discern diminution in the artistic virtuosity of the painter. One may not care for the compositional quality (the artist’s grouping and arrangement of parts) of the 1872 Roesen, but this is not to say that the picture (Fig. 6) is lacking in artistic execution in other respects. It has even been averred by Roesen’s most recent historians that “There is little chronological development in Roesen’s oeuvre since about 1850” (Gerdts and Burke, p. 61.) Having said that, in their next sentence the authors refer to his “later more elaborate canvases”. This greater elaboration is one of his most easily discernible developments.

The constant qualities of Roesen’s work, however, are much more impressive than his developmental trends. Most of his works, from his earliest to his last, show the same qualities: limitation of subject matter, meticulous attention to detail, calligraphic treatment of branches and tendrils, fanciful combinations of fruits and flowers, structural

accuracy of botanical detail, adherence to European academic conventions of still-life painting, and the translucency of his coloration. Born’s reference to the “somewhat scorched coloration” of Roesen’s paintings (p. 25) may be ascribed to the fact that in his visit to Williamsport he saw paintings badly in need of cleaning and restoration.

I have alluded to lack of imagination as an attribute of Roesen’s work. Reference has also been made to the complicated abundance of some of his compositions (Illustrated by Fig. 8). I would like to again refer to these, and to comment upon the latter of these characteristics, by quoting portions of a paragraph I wrote nearly twenty years ago:

“The abundance displayed in the paintings may have appealed to the taste of contemporary Americans. The citizens of a prosperous lumbering town of a century ago liked bountiful bouquets and their fruits piled high. A prosperous community elicited an abundant art from a generous though improverished artist. He painted objectively, realistically, materialistically, and with little imagination . . . Unprotestingly he painted a product which pleased his patrons. And equally unprotestingly, if local legend can be relied upon, he wandered away to die a pauper in a Pennsylvania poorhouse.”

Rosen’s paintings have been included in many recent exhibitions of American masterpieces. In a catalogue to one of these it is stated that among American still-life painters deriving from the European miniaturist tradition “Roesen is surely the finest.” This is an assessment with which all owners and most art historians and critics may most emphatically agree.

In the foregoing remarks I have used the following sources: Anon., “August Roesen, Artist: An Interesting Williamsport Genius Recalled by His Works”, *Williamsport Sun and Banner*, June 27, 1895 (the artist’s first name is in error) Born, Wolfgang. *Still-Life Painting in America*. New York, 1947. Cowdrey, Mary Bartlett. *American Academy of Fine Arts and American Art-Union*. 2 vol., New York, 1953. Frankenstein, Alfred. *After the Hunt: William Harnett and Other American Still Life Painters, 1870-1900*. New edition, Berkeley, California, 1969. Gerdts, William H. and Russell Burke. *American Still-Life Painting*. New York, 1971. Mook, Maurice A. “S. Roesen, ‘The Williamsport Painter.’” *Allentown (Pa.) Morning Call*, December 3, 1955. ———. “Severin Roesen and His Family.” *Lycoming County Historical Society Journal*, Williamsport, Fall, 1972. Stone, Richard B. *Not Quite Forgotten: A Study of the Williamsport Painter, S. Roesen*. Lycoming (County) Historical Society, Williamsport, November, 1951.

I thank Louise Windle Mook who thirty years ago introduced me to the history of art, particularly American painting. I also thank Samuel J. Dornsife and Andrew K. Grugan for recently renewing my interest in the work of Severin Roesen. I gratefully acknowledge the generous help of Mrs. Edna L. Hazelton for sharing with me her detailed knowledge of the Roesen family.

THE
WILLIAMSPORT
PAINTER



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Figure 1: *Still Life: Flowers and Fruit*, 36x26. In the collection of The Corcoran Gallery of Art. Signed and dated 1848. The earliest dated Roesen, painted the year the artist came to New York. Acquired in 1961.



Figure 2: *Nature's Bounty*, 29x39½. One of two fruit pieces by Roesen in The White House Collection. Acquired in 1962 The bird is an "unexpected bit of animation"; only one other Roesen includes a bird. Signed "S. Roesen 1851". The other White House Roesen, acquired in 1961, is signed and dated 1850. Several Roesens have been entitled "Nature's Bounty".



Figures 4 and 5: These paintings are a fine example of a "matched pair": both are vertical ovals, 36 x 29; neither is dated, but both are



signed with the *S* and *R* combined in the signature. Courtesy of a Private Collector, Williamsport, Pennsylvania.

Roesen Picture Credits

All paintings here illustrated are oil on canvas. Dimensions are in inches and the vertical always precedes the horizontal dimension.



Figure 6: *Flowers and Fruit*, 30 x 43. signed and dated 1872. Present owner unknown; formerly in a Private Collection, Williamsport, Pennsylvania. Reproduced from "Not Quite Forgotten" by Richard B. Stone by courtesy of the Lycoming County Historical Society. The last dated Roesen, painted the year he left Williamsport and is said to have died in Philadelphia.

Figure 3: *Still Life of Assorted Fruit*, 29½ x 40. Signed "S. Roesen, 1851". Courtesy of The Kennedy Galleries, Inc. New York. Unique in the umlaut spelling of the name; the only Roesen painting known to be so signed.





(Back Cover-top) Courtesy of Samuel J. Dornsife, Williamsport, Pennsylvania, *Fruit*, 26 x 34, signed "S. Roesen".

(Back Cover-bottom) Courtesy of Dr. and Mrs. John J. McDonough, Youngstown, Ohio. *Flowers*, 16 x 20, signed "S. Roesen".

Figure 7: *Pink Roses in Glass Vase*, 17 x 14, signed and dated 1865. A fine example of one of Roesen's smaller compositions. Formerly in the Doeblner family collection, Williamsport, Pennsylvania. Reproduced from "Not Quite Forgotten" by Richard B. Stone by courtesy of the Lycoming County Historical Society.

Figure 8: *Still Life: Fruit*, 36 x 50. Courtesy of The Metropolitan Museum of Art, Rogers Fund, 1963. An excellent example of the "complicated abundance" of some of Roesen's larger compositions. The Metropolitan also has a more frequently reproduced and better known Roesen *Still Life: Flowers*, well reproduced in color on the cover of the November, 1971 issue of the Book-of-the-Month Club *News*.



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